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Abstract
In this study, I estimate the eﬀects that mothers' experience of negative economic shocks
during pregnancy or shortly after childbirth has on children's subjective and objective health
measures in Malawi. Using data from the Malawi Longitudinal Study on Families and Health
(MLSFH), I ﬁnd that children whose mothers were hit by such economic shocks were about
7 percentage points less likely to be reported to be in excellent health and 8 percentage points
less likely to be reported to be in much better health compared to children of the same age and
sex in the same village by their mothers. They were also about 300 grams lighter and 0.3
centimeters shorter than others, although the latter estimate is relatively imprecise and not
statistically signiﬁcant at conventional signiﬁcance levels. These results are robust to various
econometric speciﬁcations and sample selection rules. In addition, I propose a simple model
to account for the fact that economic shocks are self-reported and show that my results are
likely to continue to hold under reasonable assumptions about the rates of false positive and
false negative reports of these economic shocks.
Keywords: Economic shocks, Child health, Malawi, Sub-Saharan Africa
JEL: I10, J13, C21
1 Introduction
There has been a strong and long-standing interest in social sciences in the production function
of infant health, as it has been shown to be critical for the development of health and human
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capital more broadly throughout the entire life-cycle (Aizer and Currie 2014, Almond et al.
2017, Barker 1990, Bhalotra and Rawlings 2013, Case and Paxson 2008a,b, 2009, 2010, Case et
al. 2005, Currie 2011, Currie and Almond 2011, Currie and Moretti 2007, Currie and Vogl 2013,
Currie et al. 2018, Grossman 1972, Heckman 2006, Nandi et al. 2017, Rosenzweig and Schultz
1982)1. As a result, understanding the determinants of infant health, particularly at the very
beginning of life, is crucial for any theories and policies addressing the development of human
capital throughout the life course.
Studies have shown that mothers' socio-demographic characteristics, such as their education,
income, employment, as well as their health care use and health behaviors such as cigarette
smoking and alcohol consumption, are all important inputs that enter into the infant health
production function (Corman et al. 2017). A growing and more recent literature in economics
has focused on the importance of in utero stress experienced by mothers, which has been shown
to have important negative eﬀects on infant health (Corman et al. 2017, Currie et al. 2018).
Among all of these diﬀerent forms of exposure to stress, malnutrition in utero and during
very early life due to irregular food intakes and lack of nutrients is particularly detrimental to
children's health and development (Almond and Mazumder 2011, Almond et al. 2015, Barker
1995, Lavy et al. 2016, Nandi et al. 2017, Neelsen and Stratmann 2011, Schultz-Nielsen et al.
2016). Indeed, it is now well-documented that nutritional deprivation in formative years can have
permanent eﬀects on body-size in adulthood (Barker 1998, Coly et al. 2006, De Onis and Branca
2016, Glewwe et al. 2001, Martorell 1999), risks of chronic diseases (Huxley et al. 2000, Whincup
et al. 2008), cognitive development (Hoddinott et al. 2013) and socio-economic outcomes (Currie
and Vogl 2013, Hoddinott et al. 2013, Martorell et al. 2009, WHO 1995).
Malnutrition can be triggered by many factors, among which lack of disposable income is
perhaps the most important (Sen 1982). Economic shocks occurring in utero or early in life can
be particularly damaging for infants whose mothers live in vulnerable environments with very
limited resources. Indeed, mothers can ﬁnd themselves trapped in critical situations in which the
only way they can cope with the consequences of economic shocks is to adjust their diet or the
ones of their newborns. This is especially true in regions of extreme poverty with non-existent
or weak public safety nets. In Sub-Sahara African countries, for example, any shocks that aﬀect
the economic situation of pregnant women or mothers can have devastating eﬀects on the health
of their children if they are forced to reduce their infant's food quality and food intakes or cease
1See Prinz et al. (2018) for a review.
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breastfeeding earlier than recommended (Joanna Briggs et al. 2012)2.
While evidence of the importance of economic shocks during pregnancy or at birth on infant
health is well known in developed countries (Banerjee et al. 2010, Carlson 2015, Rohde et al.
2017, Van den Berg et al. 2006), corresponding evidence in developing countries is more scarce
(Currie and Vogl 2013).
Using a month-long blackout in Zanzibar3 as a negative transitory income shock, Burlando
(2014) ﬁnds that children exposed in utero to the electric power outage were about 150 grams
lighter at birth compared to those who were not exposed to the shock. Maccini and Yang (2009)
ﬁnd that women who were exposed to positive income shock (measured in terms of unexpected
positive rainfall shock) during the year of their birth in Indonesia were in better self-rated health
and were taller than others, by about half a centimeter, when they were adults. Bozzoli and
Quintana-Domeque (2014) document a decrease in birth weight of about 30 grams for children
born from mothers who were subject to macroeconomic ﬂuctuation following the Argentinian
economic crisis early in 2000s. Similarly, Paxson and Schady (2005) ﬁnd that the economic crisis
in Peru resulted in an increase of about 2.5 percentage point in infant mortality rate for children
born during the crisis of the late 1980s.
While evidence suggests that negative (positive) economic shocks during pregnancy or shortly
after birth negatively (positively) aﬀect infant health, the nature of the shocks in some of these
studies in developing countries raises concerns about the generalizability of their ﬁndings (Mac-
cini and Yang 2009). While lack of and excess rainfall are likely to be the most common type of
shocks in rural regions in developing countries (Adhvaryu et al. 2018, Dinkelman 2013), other
shocks like severe economic crises and blackouts, although interesting in their own, might happen
relatively infrequently and be very speciﬁc to the local situation. The eﬀects of these particular
shocks could therefore raise concern about generalizability because of the very speciﬁc subpop-
ulations these eﬀects are estimated for, calling into question the relevance of the ﬁndings.
In this study, I estimate the eﬀects that negative economic shocks experienced by mothers
while pregnant or shortly after giving birth have on subjective and objective health measures for
children in Malawi. Malawi is a Sub-Saharan country located in East central Africa and is one of
the world's poorest countries. With about 70% of its population living below the international
2Economic shocks could for instance increase the opportunity cost of breastfeeding through their eﬀects on
labor demand (Thai et al. 2012).
3The blackout was due to an accidental break in the undersea cable that connects Zanzibar with the electricity
generators on mainland Tanzania.
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poverty line in 2016 ($1.90 per person per day) (International Monetary Fund 2017), Malawi is a
country where poverty is deep and wide. Poverty is particularly high in rural areas where about
85% of the population lives (Orr et al. 2001), most of them in small farms. As a rural country
with a mostly agricultural economy, poverty is closely linked to malnutrition, food insecurity
and famine (Devereux 1999, Orr et al. 2001)4. Children are often the collateral victims of these
economic shocks in Malawi, one reason being that dietary adjustments are the principal coping
strategies in cases of economic diﬃculties (Devereux 1999)5. Although child malnutrition is
on the decline, the prevalence of stunting among children under ﬁve in Malawi is still at 37%
(International Monetary Fund 2017), one of the highest rate in the world (De Onis and Branca
2016).
I investigate the consequences of negative economic shocks at birth on two sets of health out-
comes. The ﬁrst set of outcomes represents measures of subjective health of children as reported
by their mother. The second set of outcome variables represents anthropometric measures of
these children (weight and height) which are directly associated with malnutrition. Anthropo-
metric outcomes such as weight and height are widely used as health indicators for assessing
the adequacy of nutrition and growth in infancy (Currie and Vogl 2013, Fishman et al. 2004,
Thomas and Strauss 1992, Thomas et al. 1990, WHO 1995) and have been shown to be related
to infant survival (Chen et al. 1980, Fishman et al. 2004), skill development and productivity
later in life (Cravioto and Arrieta 1986).
Using data from the Malawian Longitudinal Study of Family and Health (MLSFH), I ﬁnd
that children whose mothers experience economic shocks during the year of their birth are about
7 percentage points less likely to be in excellent health and 8 percentage points less likely to be in
much better health as compared to children of the same age and sex in the same village. I show
that in addition to having statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on these subjective health measures,
negative economic shocks also have substantial eﬀects on objective health measures. I ﬁnd that
children who are born during the year when their mothers experience economic shocks were
about 300 grams lighter and 0.3 centimeters shorter than others. These eﬀects are large and
are robust to the inclusion of various economic speciﬁcations and sample selections. I show
that mothers who are able to draw ﬁnancial and in-kind help from their social network are
4In 2013, 84% of individuals living in rural households experienced food insecurity for at least one month per
year (International Monetary Fund 2017).
5In a survey of 104 household conducted in Zamba district in the South of Malawi, Devereux (1999) found
that 74% of rural households reported eating only one meal per day in the hungry season usually from December
to April.
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able to buﬀer the negative eﬀects of these shocks on children health while mothers with limited
access to such help are not able to do so. Overall, these results suggest that mothers have
diﬃculty maintaining their own and their children's nutritional intake when hit by economic
shocks, hindering the normal development of their infants.
2 Data source and sample selection
The analysis is based on the Malawian Longitudinal Study of Family and Health (MLSFH), a
panel survey collected of rural households in Malawi almost every two years since 1998. Orig-
inally established to study the inﬂuence of social network on fertility behaviors and HIV risk
perceptions, the scope of the MLSFH has since then greatly expanded and provides now very
detailed information on demographic and socio-economic characteristics, family structure, social
network and social capital, intergenerational relations as well as health conditions of about 4,000
people living in three rural regions of Malawi (Kohler et al. 2014): Rumphi in the north, Mchinji
in the centre and Balaka in the south. While not designed to be representative of rural Malawi,
the sample characteristics of the MLSFH has been found to match those of the Demography
and Health Survey (DHS), which is representative of the rural population in Malawi (Anglewicz
et al. 2009).
My study uses the ﬁfth wave of data collection of 2008. Among the now ten waves of data
that have been collected to date, wave 5 is the only one that includes anthropometric measures
of children, which I use to derive objective measures of child health status.
The results for subjective health measures are based on a sample of 1784 children who were
born between 2003 and 2008, which I will refer to as the "subjective health sample". Only
a subset of them participated in the anthropometric measurements module. The sample from
which I derive my results on objective health measures is therefore smaller, consisting of 789
children, which I will call the "anthropometric sample".
2.1 Outcome variables
2.1.1 Subjective measures of health
From the family roster of the MLSFH survey wave 5, I derive six binary outcome variables from
three questions asking mothers to evaluate the health of their children.
The ﬁrst question asks mothers whether their child has been ill in the past 12 months and
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if yes, for how long. Possible answers to the question were "no", "yes, for less than a month",
"yes, for 1 to 3 months", "yes, for 3 to 6 months", "yes, for 6 months or longer" and "don't
know". I derived two binary variables from this question, one that takes the value 1 if the child
has been ill over the past 12 months and 0 otherwise, and another that takes the value 1 if the
child has been ill for at least 1 month and 0 otherwise. Panel A of Table 1 shows that 59% of
the children in my sample were ill at some point during the year preceding the interview and
6% of them were ill for at least 1 month.
The next two binary variables are derived from the second question, which asks mothers to
rate the health of their child in general. Based on a Likert scale measure ranging from "excellent"
to "very poor", I derive a binary variable that takes the value 1 if they considered the health of
their child as being very good or better and 0 otherwise, and another indicator that takes the
value 1 if the health of the child was considered as being excellent and 0 otherwise. Panel A of
Table 1 shows that a large share of the 1784 children in my sample were reported to be at least
in very good health (75%) and in excellent health (38%), respectively.
My last two outcome variables are derived from a third question in which the mothers are
asked to compare the health of their child to other children of the same age and sex in the
village. The ﬁrst variable derived from this question takes the value 1 if the mothers considered
their child to be in better health as compared to other children of the same age and sex in the
village and 0 otherwise, and the second takes the value 1 if they considered the health of their
child to be much better than other children of the same age and sex and 0 otherwise. Table
1 shows that the subjective assessment of the mothers regarding the health of their children is
very high, with 65% of the mothers saying that their child is in better health and 34% of them
saying that they are in much better health than others.
Columns 5 and 7 of Table 1 show that on average, children who have experienced a shock
at birth have lower subjective health measures as compared to those who have not experienced
these shocks. While purely associative, these diﬀerences are already suggestive regarding the
possible negative eﬀects of economic shocks at birth on children's health.
Because all the binary outcome variables derived above are subjective, I complement my
analysis by also using anthropometric measures of the children in my sample to estimate the
eﬀects of negative economic shocks at birth on objective child health measures.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the subjective health sample (Panel A) and anthropometric sample (Panel
B)
All sample Shock at birth No shock at birth
Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Mean Std
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Subjective health sample
Ill over the past 12 months .59 .49 0 1 .63 .48 .57 .49
Ill for more than 1 month .06 .24 0 1 .08 .27 .06 .23
Very good health .75 .43 0 1 .73 .44 .76 .43
Excellent health .38 .49 0 1 .34 .47 .40 .49
Better health than others .65 .48 0 1 .62 .48 .66 .47
Much better health than others .34 .47 0 1 .30 .46 .35 .48
Economic shock at birth .27 .44 0 1 1 0
Female .50 .50 0 1 .51 .50 .50 .50
Age 2.60 1.67 0 5 1.87 1.36 2.87 1.70
Age of the mother at birth 27.09 7.31 11 50 27.14 7.21 27.07 7.35
Obs. 1784
B. Anthropometric sample
Weight (in kg) 11.41 3.46 2 23 9.81 3.02 12.08 3.42
Height (in cm) 81.58 13.59 43 145 74.96 11.75 84.39 13.34
Economic shock at birth .30 .46 0 1 1 0 0 0
Female .53 .50 0 1 .53 .50 .53 .50
Age 2.44 1.47 0 5 1.63 1.17 2.78 1.45
Age of the mother at birth 27.10 7.51 15 50 27.55 7.72 26.91 7.41
Obs. 789
Note: Sample derived from the MLSFH data wave 5. Descriptive statistics of children of the respondents born
between 2003 and 2008.
2.1.2 Objective measures of health - Anthropometrics
From the anthropometric module of wave 5, I derive several objective outcome variables to
determine the health status of the children in the study. First, I determine the eﬀects of negative
economic shocks on weight in kilograms (kg) and height (length) in centimeters (cm)6.
On the one hand, child weight has been shown to be correlated with infant prospects for
survival (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982, Susser et al. 1972) as well as with the prevalence of several
infectious diseases such as pneumonia, diarrhoea and malaria (Fishman et al. 2004). Being
underweight as a child is also linked to impaired cognitive development, intellectual deﬁcits
and poor school performance and is associated with increased risk of chronic diseases later
in life, functional impairment and reduced work capacity (Fishman et al. 2004). Height, on
the other hand, is a good proxy for exposure to disease and deprivation typically experienced
within the ﬁrst three years of life (Beach et al. 2018, Currie and Vogl 2013, Parman 2015,
Thomas et al. 1990, WHO 1995). In general, abnormal anthropometric measurements can have
6Note that these measures were collected by trained interviewers following strict protocols and were not
self-reported. I use height to refer to both length, measured in recumbent position, and stature, measured in
standing position. In all regressions in which height is the outcome variable, I control for whether the height of
the child was measured in a recumbent or standing position.
7
signiﬁcant short- and long-term health consequences such as an increase in incidence and severity
of morbidity, mortality, poor psychological and intellectual development (WHO 1995) and are
strong indicators of malnutrition.
Panel B of Table 1 shows that on average, children in my sample weight about 11kg (ﬁrst
row) and are about 82cm tall (second row). Again, comparing these measures between children
who experienced economic shocks at birth and those who did not (Column 5 and 7), one can
see a large diﬀerence between the two groups, which may potentially suggest important eﬀects
of these economic shocks on child health. It is worth mentioning here that the substantial
diﬀerence in these two groups are mainly due to age diﬀerence. Indeed, as shown in the ﬁfth row
of Panel B of Table 1, children who experienced a shock at birth are on average 1.6 years old
whereas those who did not are 2.8 years old. These diﬀerences in age in both samples are due
to the structure of the questionnaire. That is, respondents are more likely to report shocks that
were experienced in recent years and, given that I am matching these shocks to children born
between 2003 and 2008, children with economic shocks at birth will be by construction younger
than others. In the analysis that follows, I will include age in year dummies in all my models to
ensure that I am estimating the eﬀects of economic shocks on child health for a given age.
2.2 Economic shocks
The 2008 questionnaire includes an economic shock module in which respondents are asked
whether their households have faced any negative economic shocks over the last ﬁve years and
if so, during which years the shocks occurred, and their impact on the community in which they
live7.
More speciﬁcally, the question is: "Over the past ﬁve years, was your household severely
aﬀected negatively by any of the following unexpected events or crises?", where the proposed
unexpected shocks were listed as follows: "Death or serious illness of an adult member or someone
who provides support for yourself or your family", "Poor crop yields, loss of crops due to disease
or pests, or loss of livestock due to theft or disease, or loss of coupon", "Loss of source of income-
such as loss of employment, business failure, someone who had been assisting the household
stopped their support", "Big change in price of grain (either increase or decrease)", "Breakup of
household, such as a divorce", "Damage to house due to ﬁre, ﬂood, or other unexpected event" or
7Note that questions related to economic shocks were asked after the questions about children's health. This
should minimize the potential concern of ex-post rationalization that could inﬂuence mothers' evaluation of the
health of their children.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the negative economics shocks in both samples
Subjective health sample Anthropometric sample
Count % Count %
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Obs. 1784 789
Economic shock at birth 473 .27 235 .30
Idiosycratic shocks 189 .40 99 .42
Common shocks 329 .70 163 .69
Death or serious illness 125 .26 65 .28
Poor crop yields or loss due to disease/pests 197 .42 105 .45
Loss of source of income 74 .16 38 .16
Big change in price of grain 146 .31 79 .34
Breakup of household 32 .07 17 .07
Damage to house due to ﬁre, ﬂood etc 22 .05 15 .06
Other shocks 2 .00 2 .01
Note: Sample derived from the MLSFH data wave 5. Idiosyncratic shocks are shocks aﬀecting the respondent's
household only. Common shocks are shocks aﬀecting other households as well. The ﬁrst two columns represent
the count and % of shocks in my subjective health sample and the last two represent the same statistics for my
anthropometric sample. It is worth noting that children can experience several shocks during their year of birth.
any shock respondents could specify. Moreover, for the three most important shocks that they
have experienced over the past ﬁve years, respondents are asked when (calendar year) these
shocks occurred and whether these shocks aﬀected "only the household", "other households as
well", "most households in the community" or "all households in the community".
In my analysis, each unit of observation is a child. Given that I know the year of birth of
each child and the year when economic shocks occur, I can match these self-reported shocks
to the year of birth of each child. More speciﬁcally, my self-reported economic shock variable
takes the value 1 if the mother experienced a negative economic shock the year when her child
was born and 0 otherwise. The limitation of this analysis is that these economic shocks are
self-reported. As will be detailed in Section 6, errors in self-reported shocks are likely to bias
my estimated eﬀects. I discuss this issue at length below, where I propose two diﬀerent ways to
assess the robustness of my ﬁndings to economic shock misreports.
Table 2 describes the shocks that children in my two samples have been exposed to in utero or
during the year of birth. Out of the 1784 children in my subjective health sample, 473 were born
in a year when their mother experienced a negative economic shock (about 27%), which shows
how prevalent and widespread economic instability is in these low income and rural regions of
Malawi. About 70% of these shocks were "common shocks" in the sense that they aﬀected not
only the household of the respondent but also other households, and 40% of these shocks were
"idiosyncratic" in the sense that they impacted the household of the respondent only. When
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breaking down these shocks by categories, "Poor crop yields or loss due to disease/pests" and
"Big change in price of grain" were the two most common shocks, representing about 42% and
31% of the shocks, respectively. When looking at my anthropometric sample (Columns 3 and
4), one can see that the rate of occurrence of these shocks and the percentage of these shocks
are very similar to the subjective health sample.
2.3 Control variables
Some characteristics of the mothers, if not controlled for, could result in omitted variable bias
in my attempt to estimate the eﬀects of economic shocks on child health. Indeed, any variables
that are not controlled for and are correlated with both my assumed exogenous and self-reported
economic shock and my dependent variables would jeopardize the causal interpretation of my
estimates. For this reason, I control for a wide set of mother characteristics. For instance, wealth
of the respondents is likely to be correlated with the probability of experiencing (and reporting)
a negative economic shock and with child health. For this reason I include as independent
variable a continuous wealth index based on a set of 20 dwelling characteristics and ownership of
household durable assets constructed using ﬁrst principal component analysis (Chin 2010, Filmer
and Pritchett 1998, Hyder et al. 2015, Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006)8. In addition to wealth,
my analysis also controls for various factors that could inﬂuence both self-reported negative
economic shock and child health such as the region where the mother lives, the ethnicity and the
level of education of the mother, which proxies for unobserved family background characteristics
(Behrman and Wolfe 1987, Thomas et al. 1990), the value of the crops that the household
has produced during the last growing season, the total household expenditure on various items
(clothes, fabric, shoes, medical expenses, fertilizer, seeds, hired labor, agricultural tools and
equipment and expenses related to funerals, all at the household level) and the amount the
household has spent for its children over the three months prior to the interview9. The sex and
age of the child, the age of the mother at the time of the child birth and the child's birth order
are also controlled for.
Table 1 shows that about half of the children in my subjective and objective samples are
8Wealth measures based on household asset ownership are usually used to control for stable household wealth
characteristics (Behrman and Knowles 1999, Thomas and Strauss 1992). Because wealth can potentially be
directly related to the (previous) experience of economic shocks, I use as robustness check past wealth measures
instead of the current one (in 2008) to control for initial wealth levels that could mitigate the damaging eﬀects
of negative shocks. I show that my results are robust to various speciﬁcations of wealth measure variables.
9Household expenditure is usually considered as a better measure of long-run resources availability than total
income, especially in rural communities where income is variable (Thomas and Strauss 1992, Thomas et al. 1990).
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girls and the average age of the children at the interview is about 2.5 years old. As shown in
this table, the average age of the mothers at child birth in the two samples is very similar and
equal to 27.1 years old.
3 Method
Multivariable linear regressions are conducted to estimate the eﬀects of negative economic shocks
experienced by mothers during the year they gave birth on the various subjective and objective
measures of child health10. More speciﬁcally, I estimate the following model:
Hi = α0 + α1S∗i +X ′iα2 + νi (1)
where Hi is the subjective or objective health measures of child i in 2008, S∗i is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if the mother of i has experienced a negative economic shock
during the year of i's birth and X ′i is a set of control variables. Because of the size of my
sample, I sequentially add more controls in my speciﬁcation and investigate the stability of my
estimates. In my benchmark speciﬁcation, X ′i includes a set of child age dummies, the age
of the mother at child birth as well as the sex of the child (set 1). Set 2 includes set 1 as
well as mothers' socio-economic characteristics that are relatively stable over time and are less
likely to be aﬀected by economic shocks. More speciﬁcally, set 2 adds the marital status of the
mother, her level of education (dummies for none, primary and secondary level of education), the
component analysis-based continuous wealth score as well as the birth order of the child11. Set 3,
in addition to the controls in set 2, includes variables that can possibly be aﬀected by economic
shocks and mediate the relationship between these shocks and child health. Set 3 includes the
total value of the household crop production over the last growing season (in deciles), the total
household expenditure and the total household expenditure on children in the three months prior
to the interview, both also in deciles. In addition to these variables, all my regressions include
ethnicity and region dummies to control for any systematic diﬀerences in these three regions.
The samples I use to derive my results on subjective (objective) measures of health consist of
10I also provide estimates derived from Logit and Probit models when the outcome variables under consider-
ation are binary.
11Note that I use the most up-to-date information available at the year of birth to deﬁne these variables. In
other words, information collected in wave 5 (2008), wave 4 (2006) and wave 3 (2004) was used to deﬁne these
variables for children born in 2007-2008, 2005-2006 and 2003-2004, respectively. If information was missing in
some waves, I use the most recent information available.
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1784 (789) children from 1153 (589) diﬀerent mothers12. In all the results below, standard errors
are clustered at the mother level.
4 Results
4.1 Subjective outcomes
Table 3 summarizes the eﬀects of negative economic shocks on the subjective health measures
of the children in my sample. Columns 1, 2 and 3 represent these eﬀects when the set of control
variables 1, 2 and 3 are used, respectively. The ﬁrst two rows show that experiencing an economic
shock in utero or early in life increases the probability of being ill later in life, although these
eﬀects are small and relatively imprecisely estimated. Rows 3 and 4 show that economic shocks
reduce the probability of being in very good and excellent health by about 4 percentage points
and 7 percentage points, respectively. The eﬀects on the probability of being on excellent health
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 95%-level whereas the eﬀects on very good health fail to be
signiﬁcant at conventional levels. The negative eﬀects of economic shocks can also be seen when
mothers are asked to evaluate the health of their child as compared to children of the same age
and sex in the village. Children born in the year when an economic shock occurs are less likely to
be in better and much better health than their counterparts. The latter eﬀect is large and highly
signiﬁcant: children who experienced a shock in utero or in the year of birth are 8% points less
likely to be in much better health than others. When looking at these eﬀects separately for boys
and girls (Columns 4 and 5), one can see that the eﬀects are rather similar, although they are
more pronounced and precisely estimated for boys. This ﬁnding is consistent with the literature
about the fragility of boys in the beginning of life (Kraemer 2000). Corresponding results using
Logit and Probit models instead of linear probability models are presented in Tables A.1 and
A.2 of the Online Appendix A. The marginal eﬀects presented in these two tables are very close
to those obtained in Table 3.
The above provides ﬁrst preliminary evidence of the negative eﬀects of economic shocks
experienced in utero or at birth on child health later in life. That being said, these results are
based on subjective measures and might therefore be biased because of reporting heterogeneity.
Exploiting my relatively large subjective health sample and the fact that I observe several
12Note that I dropped 4 outliers in my objective measure sample: these four children were reported to be 103,
99, 48 and 33 centimeters tall at age 0, 0, 3 and 4, respectively. Including them in my analysis however does not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the results of my estimates.
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Table 3: Eﬀects of negative economic shocks at birth on subjective health outcomes
- linear probability model
Probability of being: Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Boy Girl
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ill in the last 12 months .010 .021 .019 .005 .034
(.028) (.032) (.032) (.045) (.045)
ill for more than 1 month .016 .016 .015 .019 .012
(.014) (.016) (.016) (.024) (.023)
in very good health -.016 -.037 -.036 -.034 -.048
(.026) (.030) (.030) (.040) (.043)
in excellent health -.033 -.069∗∗ -.073∗∗ -.097∗∗ -.058
(.027) (.030) (.030) (.044) (.044)
in better health -.029 -.059∗ -.054∗ -.066 -.045
(.028) (.032) (.032) (.044) (.047)
in much better health -.033 -.081∗∗∗ -.080∗∗∗ -.114∗∗∗ -.060
(.027) (.029) (.029) (.041) (.043)
Obs. 1784 1384 1382 700 682
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Eﬀects of negative economic shocks during the year of birth
on subjective health outcomes. Columns 1, 2 and 3 include set of controls 1, 2 and 3,
respectively. Columns 4 and 5 include the same controls as Column 3. Estimates of the
other coeﬃcients are available upon request.
children per mother in some cases, I can add mother ﬁxed eﬀects in the analysis to control for
unobserved mother characteristics that are constant across births such as potential time-invariant
eﬀects, including reporting heterogeneity. Table B.1 in the Online Appendix B shows that my
results are robust to the inclusion of mother ﬁxed eﬀects to capture unobserved attributes
of mothers and/or households that could be correlated with both child health and economic
shocks13.
The results so far present some important evidence of the negative eﬀects that economic
shocks experienced at birth have on subjective child health outcomes. I now focus my analysis
on objective measures of child health.
13The same appendix presents the ﬁxed-eﬀect logit analog to the previous linear ﬁxed-eﬀect analysis. Results
in Table B.2 are again very consistent to the ones obtained in the linear ﬁxed-eﬀect analysis.
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4.2 Objective health measures
4.2.1 Main results
Table 4 shows the eﬀects of economic shocks experienced in utero or during the year of birth on
children's weight. Again, Columns 1, 2 and 3 include the set of controls 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
One can see in the ﬁrst row that these shocks have a strong and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the weight of the children in my sample. Experiencing such a shock decreases children's weight
by about 330 grams. These eﬀects are particularly robust to the inclusion of additional control
variables in Columns 2 and 3. Looking at the other control variables included in my models,
one can see that, not surprisingly, weight increases with age and girls are lighter than boys.
The age of the mother at birth increases the weight of the children by about 30 grams, which
is consistent with previous studies (Bakker et al. 2011, MacLeod and Kiely 1988). Again, when
estimating the models by sex (Columns 4 and 5), one can see that the economic shocks have
more damaging eﬀects on boys than on girls (549 grams lighter for boys compared to 123 grams
for girls). This suggests the absence of gender bias towards male (Maccini and Yang 2009) and
is consistent with the fact that boys are more prone to being underweight, stunted and suﬀering
from wasting early in life (De Onis et al. 1997).
Table 5 presents the same set of estimates but looks at height instead of weight. One can
see that economic shocks experienced in utero or during the year of birth reduced the height of
the children by about 0.3 centimeters (depending on the set of controls) but these eﬀects fail to
be signiﬁcant. As was the case in the subjective measures of health and weight, boys appear
to be more aﬀected by these shocks, although in the case of height, the eﬀect is not precisely
estimated.
These estimates control for wealth level in 2008. Because wealth level could potentially be
aﬀected by economic shocks, I assess the robustness of my results in deﬁning wealth level as
the level prior to the birth of the child. Table C.1 in the Online Appendix C shows that using
household wealth level in 2004, which is prior to most of the births in my sample, does not aﬀect
my estimates substantively.
Moreover, the analysis above focuses on the average eﬀects of economic shocks in utero or at
birth on children's weight and height. It could however be interesting to know where in the weight
and height distributions these eﬀects are taking place. To do so, I compute weight-for-age and
height-for-age z-scores and estimate the eﬀects of economic shocks on the probability of being d
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Table 4: Eﬀects of negative economic shocks at birth on weight
(1) (2) (3)
Male
(4)
Female
(5)
Economic shock at birth -0.336∗∗ -0.325∗ -0.353∗∗ -0.549∗∗ -0.123
(0.164) (0.173) (0.175) (0.253) (0.207)
Age of child = 1 3.103∗∗∗ 3.107∗∗∗ 3.140∗∗∗ 3.421∗∗∗ 2.655∗∗∗
(0.242) (0.255) (0.257) (0.390) (0.295)
Age of child = 2 4.510∗∗∗ 4.589∗∗∗ 4.608∗∗∗ 4.792∗∗∗ 4.154∗∗∗
(0.243) (0.259) (0.263) (0.402) (0.296)
Age of child = 3 6.736∗∗∗ 6.819∗∗∗ 6.868∗∗∗ 6.735∗∗∗ 6.679∗∗∗
(0.262) (0.291) (0.292) (0.428) (0.322)
Age of child = 4 8.521∗∗∗ 8.631∗∗∗ 8.619∗∗∗ 8.818∗∗∗ 8.159∗∗∗
(0.232) (0.268) (0.272) (0.387) (0.290)
Age of child = 5 9.426∗∗∗ 9.582∗∗∗ 9.664∗∗∗ 8.763∗∗∗ 9.833∗∗∗
(0.355) (0.463) (0.459) (0.562) (0.465)
Age of mother at birth 0.030∗∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.030∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.023∗
(0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.012)
Female -0.501∗∗∗ -0.590∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.157) (0.156)
Mother married at birth 0.046 0.047
(0.350) (0.352)
Primary level of education -0.133 -0.167
(0.219) (0.216)
Secondary level of education -0.274 -0.258
(0.443) (0.454)
Wealth score -0.064 -0.061
(0.054) (0.058)
Birth order -0.013 -0.047
(0.064) (0.065)
Total value of crop production (10 quantiles) -0.011
(0.037)
Total expenditure of HH (10 quantiles) -0.127∗
(0.066)
Total expenditure on children (10 quantiles) 0.179∗∗
(0.072)
Constant 5.330∗∗∗ 5.905∗∗∗ 5.779∗∗∗ 4.639∗∗∗ 5.154∗∗∗
(0.509) (0.705) (0.725) (0.828) (0.591)
Observations 789 639 639 372 417
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Eﬀects of
negative economic shocks during the year of birth on weight. Columns 1, 2 and 3 include set of controls 1, 2 and
3, respectively. Columns 4 and 5 include the same controls as Column 1. The reference category is a boy of age 0
from the central region of Malawi who did not experience any economic shock at birth.
standard deviations away from the sex- and age-speciﬁc median, with d = {−2,−1,1,2}, as well as
the probability of being lower than the median (d = 0). Results in the Online Appendix D show
that these eﬀects appear to be quite homogeneous along the weight and height distributions and
that potentially all children are aﬀected by these shocks.
In sum, children whose mothers experience a negative economic shock during pregnancy or
the year of childbirth are signiﬁcantly less likely to be in excellent health and to be in much
better health than similar children in the village who are of the same age and sex. When it
comes to objective measures of health, these children were about 300 grams lighter than others
and about 0.3 centimeters shorter. I now further investigate the robustness of these ﬁndings and
15
Table 5: Eﬀects of negative economic shocks at birth on height
(1) (2) (3)
Male
(4)
Female
(5)
Economic shock at birth -0.705 -0.355 -0.356 -1.257 -0.152
(0.539) (0.583) (0.588) (0.799) (0.740)
Age of child = 1 13.395∗∗∗ 13.155∗∗∗ 13.171∗∗∗ 14.010∗∗∗ 12.567∗∗∗
(0.794) (0.822) (0.825) (1.155) (1.180)
Age of child = 2 20.862∗∗∗ 21.278∗∗∗ 21.292∗∗∗ 20.505∗∗∗ 20.956∗∗∗
(0.995) (1.022) (1.025) (1.386) (1.446)
Age of child = 3 28.177∗∗∗ 28.234∗∗∗ 28.262∗∗∗ 27.191∗∗∗ 28.811∗∗∗
(1.166) (1.251) (1.253) (1.593) (1.747)
Age of child = 4 34.980∗∗∗ 35.648∗∗∗ 35.664∗∗∗ 35.130∗∗∗ 34.672∗∗∗
(1.144) (1.244) (1.254) (1.507) (1.760)
Age of child = 5 41.801∗∗∗ 41.711∗∗∗ 41.763∗∗∗ 38.857∗∗∗ 43.891∗∗∗
(1.441) (1.499) (1.509) (1.735) (2.215)
Age of mother at birth 0.050∗ 0.069 0.069 0.086∗∗ 0.025
(0.030) (0.058) (0.057) (0.042) (0.040)
Female -1.503∗∗∗ -1.666∗∗∗ -1.663∗∗∗
(0.414) (0.440) (0.441)
Mother married at birth 0.304 0.332
(1.201) (1.222)
Primary level of education -0.389 -0.426
(0.757) (0.765)
Secondary level of education 0.059 0.032
(1.265) (1.270)
Wealth score 0.202 0.200
(0.158) (0.175)
Birth order -0.107 -0.129
(0.202) (0.208)
Total value of crop production (10 quantiles) -0.028
(0.113)
Total expenditure of HH (10 quantiles) -0.015
(0.182)
Total expenditure on children (10 quantiles) 0.074
(0.188)
Constant 56.358∗∗∗ 57.602∗∗∗ 57.455∗∗∗ 57.569∗∗∗ 54.092∗∗∗
(1.541) (2.401) (2.521) (2.358) (2.090)
Observations 789 639 639 372 417
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Eﬀects of
negative economic shocks during the year of birth on height. Columns 1, 2 and 3 include set of controls 1, 2 and 3,
respectively. Columns 4 and 5 include the same controls as Column 1. The reference category is a boy of age 0 from
the central region of Malawi who did not experience any economic shock at birth.
contextualize them.
4.2.2 Social transfers as informal safety net
There is a growing literature that demonstrates that the negative eﬀects of in utero or early
exposure to stress and adversity can be mitigated by parental compensating or reinforcing in-
vestments (Adhvaryu et al. 2018, Adhvaryu and Nyshadham 2016, Almond and Mazumder 2013,
Bharadwaj et al. 2018, Sievertsen and Wüst 2017). In Malawi, potential mitigation eﬀects would
be most likely to come from informal safety nets (Devereux 1999, Orr et al. 2001)14. Because
14It has been found that subsistence oriented agrarian societies have complex web of support networks that
help its more vulnerable members to protect themselves against risks and shocks (Scott 1977). Devereux (1999)
shows that transfer can contribute to as much as 14 percentage of total income in household in rural Malawi. He
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of the relatively poor public service and lack of ﬁnancial resources, individuals in economic and
ﬁnancial diﬃculties in Sub-Saharan countries like Malawi often rely on informal safety nets,
drawing on support from extended family, friends and other people in the community (Dev-
ereux 1999, Ellis et al. 2003, Orr et al. 2001).In my context, mothers who experience a negative
economic shock during pregnancy or shortly after giving birth could seek out for help among
persons in her village or community. To investigate whether informal transfers can attenuate the
eﬀects of negative economic shocks on child health, I categorize mothers whose informal ﬁnancial
and in-kind transfers, measured in the number of persons they have received transfers from at
the time of the interview, are under the median value in one group and the rest in an other. I
then regress child health on my economic shock variable using these two diﬀerent samples and
compare the coeﬃcients.
Table 6 show that mothers who received ﬁnancial and in-kind transfers from their social
network were able to buﬀer the negative eﬀects of economic shocks on both the weight and
height of their children. On the other hand, children who experienced an economic shock at
birth and whose mothers received transfers from no or relatively few people where about 600
grams lighter and 1.8 centimeters shorter than others. These eﬀects are very large and show
how important informal safety nets can be in settings with relatively poor public service and
weak social welfare system15.
4.2.3 Additional robustness checks
It has been shown that the exact period in early life during which a negative economic shock
occurs matter for child development, with the year of birth being the period that is particularly
critical for child development (Maccini and Yang 2009). To test this hypothesis, I follow Maccini
and Yang (2009) and assess whether experiencing a negative economic shock one year before or
one year after the year of birth leads to the same eﬀects as experiencing a similar shock during
the year of birth. By including these three dummy variables for the occurrence of shocks in the
same regression, I can rule out the possibility that the negative eﬀects estimated thus far are
due to serially correlated shocks that happened prior or after the year of birth.
Table F.1 in the Online Appendix F shows the results of my estimations. Results for weight
suggests that the value of transfers can be much higher if one includes in kind transfers such as food, fertilizers,
clothes and unremunerated labour and childcare.
15Using the same proxies for informal safety net but measured in 2006 instead of 2008 to partially deal with
potential endogeneity issues shows similar patterns. More speciﬁcally, having a network from which mothers have
received help buﬀers the negative eﬀects of economic shocks (see Table E.1 in the Online Appendix E).
17
Table 6: Eﬀects of negative economic shocks on objective mea-
sures of health, splitting the sample by whether the mothers
have received more or less transfers than the median value
Financial and in-kind transfers received
Weight Height
Below Above Below Above
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Set of controls 1 -0.569∗∗ -0.167 -1.628∗∗ -0.040
(0.254) (0.219) (0.796) (0.740)
Set of controls 2 -0.585∗∗ -0.197 -1.851∗∗ 0.642
(0.286) (0.221) (0.894) (0.789)
Set of controls 3 -0.600∗∗ -0.216 -1.978∗∗ 0.692
(0.294) (0.219) (0.888) (0.782)
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses,
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. I split my sample by whether
respondents have received informal transfers, be they ﬁnancial or
in-kind, from fewer (Columns 1 and 3) or more (Columns 2 and 4)
persons than the median value in my sample.
show that, while experiencing a negative economic shocks irrespective of when it occurs does
have a negative eﬀect on weight, it is only for those shocks that occur during the year of birth
that have large and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on weight. Results for height show again that
only economic shocks experienced during the year of birth aﬀect height negatively. Again, these
eﬀects are not precisely estimated and it is hard to see any conclusive evidence in these results
in the case of height.
Additionally, one concern in my analysis is that negative economic shocks during the year
of birth could have an eﬀect on child mortality. If that is the case, then my results above could
potentially underestimate the true eﬀects of these shocks on child health, as there would be a
selection into life, leaving only "healthy" and "strong" children in my sample. Fortunately, the
MLSFH allows me to test this hypothesis by tracing back the death of all the children of the
female respondents that were born between 2003 and 2008. I can therefore investigate whether
negative economic shocks at birth increased the probability of children dying by 2008. For this
analysis, my sample consists of 1939 children that were born between 2003 and 2008, out of
which 131 died by the time of the interview in 2008 (mortality rate of about 6.8%). Results in
Table G.1 of the Online Appendix G show that negative economic shocks at birth do not have
any eﬀects on mortality, irrespective of whether shocks have aﬀected only the household of the
respondent (idiosyncratic shocks) or other households as well (common shocks)16. My results
therefore seem not to be biased due to mortality selection17.
16These eﬀects are estimated separately for each type of shocks.
17The under-5 mortality rate (U5MR) prevailing in Malawi in 2008 is equal to 9.8% (The World Bank 2008).
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The results above represent the eﬀects of negative economics shocks experienced in utero or
during the year of birth on child health, assuming that these self-reported economic shocks are
exogenous and correctly reported. I now scrutinize these two assumptions a little further.
5 The eﬀects of community level shocks
Assuming that the economic shocks are correctly reported, estimating their causal eﬀects on
child health relies on the assumption that these shocks are exogenous, that is, uncorrelated
with the error term of the statistical model. This assumption may not hold if unobserved (and
uncontrolled for) characteristics of the mothers have an eﬀect on the probability of experiencing
negative economic shocks and on child health. Among the economic shocks considered in the
economic shock module of the MLSFH, "death or serious illness of an household member", "loss
of source of income", "breakup of household" and "damage to house due to ﬁre, ﬂood etc" are
perhaps the ones that are most susceptible to being endogenous because they may be aﬀected
by the mother's or household's unobserved behaviors and characteristics. On the other hand, in
addition to being the most common sources of economic shocks, "Poor crop yields, or loss due
to disease/pests"18 and "big change in price of grain"19 are plausibly more exogenous. These
shocks, sometimes called covariate shocks in the literature (Pradhan and Mukherjee 2018), have
the potential to aﬀect not only the household of the respondents but the community as a whole.
To strengthen the causal interpretation of my results, I therefore use to occurrence of these
two exogenous shocks to create a new negative economic shock dummy, which I call "covariate
shock", that takes the value 1 if one or both of these shocks were experienced by the mothers
at childbirth and 0 otherwise.
Moreover, one of the strengths of the economic shock module in the MLSFH is that it also
It is therefore possible that infant deaths are underreported in my sample and that the estimated eﬀects of
economic shocks on mortality reported in Table G.1 are biased towards 0.
18In the questionnaire, the shock is described as "Poor crop yields, loss of crops due to disease or pests, or
loss of livestock due to theft or disease, or loss of coupon". Droughts, pests and diseases are the most damaging
factors aﬀecting crop production in Malawi (Giertz et al. 2015). While some of the underlying reasons for this
negative shock could potentially be due to individual behaviors, such as agricultural practices and mitigation
activities, it is however likely that the occurrences of this shock is independent to individuals characteristics
in my context. Lack of rainfall and presence of pests and diseases, themselves exacerbated by adverse weather
events, are likely to be beyond individual's control. In addition, the use of pesticides and storage tools among
smallholder farmers in Malawi is low because of their prices and unavailability in local markets (Maonga and
Maharjan 2004). Farmers therefore have to rely on traditional methods that, although reliable, are very limited
as compared to more modern techniques.
19The vast majority of the people living in rural Malawi owns small amount of farmland (Maonga and Maharjan
2004) and are therefore unlikely to have any inﬂuence on market prices. Volatility in the price of maize, the most
important staple crop in Malawi, results from environmental factors, unpredictable domestic market interventions
and export policies (Giertz et al. 2015).
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asks respondents to report whether the shocks have also aﬀected other households in the com-
munity. Speciﬁcally, respondents are asked whether the shocks they report have aﬀected their
"own household only", "other households as well", "most households in the community" or "all
households in the community". I can thus also exploit this information and restrict my two
most plausibly exogenous shocks to only those that have aﬀected both the respondent's house-
holds and other households in the community. This reinforces the credibility of the exogeneity
assumption of the shocks I am using in my analysis.
Table 7 presents the results of regressing weight (ﬁrst panel) and height (second panel) on
the occurrence of covariate shocks at birth by diﬀerentiating the degree of the eﬀects that these
shocks have on the local community. The estimates in this table are derived using set of controls
1 in the econometric speciﬁcation20. Columns 1 shows the eﬀects of the covariate shock dummy
that combines both poor crop yields and big changes in price of grain and Column 2 presents the
results when these two shocks are considered separately but in the same regression. The results
in these two columns include shocks that have aﬀected only the household of the respondents.
One can see in Column 1 that when I restrict my analysis to covariate shocks, the eﬀect on
height is larger (about 1 centimeter decrease) and the eﬀect on weight is roughly similar. The
two coeﬃcients estimated fail to be signiﬁcant at conventional levels. When considering these
two shocks separately but in the same regression in Column 2, one can see that big changes
in price of grain have the most detrimental eﬀects on weight and height, with a reduction of
about 400 grams on weight and 1 centimeter on height. The eﬀect on weight is signiﬁcant at
90% conﬁdence. Columns 3 and 4 show the results of similar estimations but when shocks
that have aﬀected only the household of the respondents are excluded in the analysis. One can
see that considering only shocks that have aﬀected both the respondents' household and other
households results in a strong eﬀect on height, with a decrease of about 1.4 centimeters. This
eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at 95%. The eﬀect on weight is in the ballpark of what I obtain
in my benchmark analysis, although it fails to be precisely estimated. When these shocks are
considered separately (Column 4), I again ﬁnd that big changes in price of grain matter the
most, with a signiﬁcant eﬀect of about 520 grams on weight. Finally, I restrict my analysis
to shocks that have aﬀected at least most households in the community in Columns 5 and 6.
Again, the idea is that these shocks are unlikely to be driven by mothers or households behaviors
20Corresponding analyses using the two other sets of control variables are included in the Online Appendix H
Tables H.1 and H.2.
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Table 7: Eﬀects of covariate shocks on objective health outcomes for various levels of negative economic shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Weight
Covariate shocks -.257 -.216 -.305
(.191) (.221) (.257)
Poor crop yields,loss of crops due to disease or pests .107 .218 -.169
(.225) (.271) (.355)
Big change in price of grain -.445∗ -.520∗ -.246
(.245) (.275) (.299)
2. Height
Covariate shocks -.959 -1.421∗∗ -1.357∗
(.605) (.672) (.772)
Poor crop yields, loss of crops due to disease or pests -.377 -.797 -1.363
(.673) (.774) (1.126)
Big change in price of grain -1.018 -1.086 -0.713
(0.808) (0.901) (0.916)
Including shocks aﬀecting only HH y y
Excluding shocks aﬀecting only HH y y
Including only shocks aﬀecting most or all HH in community only y y
Obs. 789 789 789 789 789 789
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. These regressions include set of controls
1. Covariate shock is a dummy variable that combines shocks due to poor crop yields/disease/pest and those due to big changes in price of
grain. Columns 1 and 2 include shocks aﬀecting all households, including those that have aﬀected only the household of the respondents.
Columns 3 and 4 exclude shocks that have aﬀected only the household of the respondents. Columns 5 and 6 take into account only shocks that
have aﬀected most or all households in the community.
and can therefore be considered as exogenous. The results I derive from these estimations in
Columns 5 and 6 are close to the ones in Columns 3 and 4. More speciﬁcally, I again ﬁnd that
these covariate shocks, when considered together, have a large and somewhat precisely estimated
eﬀect on height of about 1.4 centimeters. The eﬀect on weight is in line with my benchmark
results although it fails once again to be statistically signiﬁcant.
In sum, when I restrict my analysis to shocks that are more plausibly exogenous and that have
aﬀected other households in the community as well, I obtain large and statistically signiﬁcant
negative eﬀects of these shocks on height of about 1.4 centimeters. The eﬀect on weight is a
bit smaller and less precisely estimated but still roughly similar to the eﬀects estimated in my
benchmark analysis. These results suggest that when the community as a whole is hit by a
shock, mothers cannot rely on informal safety nets to cope with economic diﬃculties.
6 Self-reported shock bias
One of the concerns in my analysis is that economic shocks are self-reported. In other contexts,
it has been found that misreporting may be systematically related to observed and unobserved
characteristics of individuals (Meyer and Mittag 2018, Meyer et al. 2018). It is therefore possible
that my shock variable may suﬀer from reporting errors due to false positive and false negative
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reported shocks. One issue for instance is that respondents are asked to recall economic shocks
that have occurred as far as ﬁve years prior to the interview. Although unexpected events or
crises are not easily forgotten, those who recall having experienced negative economic shocks over
the last previous ﬁve years might be very diﬀerent from those who do not21. Other reasons often
given to explain misreporting are social desirability and essential survey condition or survey
design such as the survey mode and method (Meyer et al. 2018). Some respondents might
therefore report having experienced a negative economic shock in a given year even if it did not
occur case of false positive while others might not report a shock even if it did occur case of
false negative. For these reasons, errors in self-reported shocks might bias my estimates.
As noted in Section 3, the structural equation I am interested in estimating is the following:
Hi = α1S∗i +X ′iα2 + νi (2)
where S∗i represents the true shock dummy variable experienced by the respondents and νi ⊥
Xi, S
∗
i . A concern might be that the shock I observe in my data, Si, does not correspond to
the vector of real shocks S∗i . This diﬀerence may stem from both observed and unobserved
characteristics of the individuals. In this section, I assess whether my estimates are likely to be
robust to such misreporting. I show that, unlike in the case of classical measurement error in
which attenuation bias can be expected, endogenous misreporting may lead to attenuation or
expansion bias, and potentially generate estimates that have the opposite sign of the true eﬀect,
a result that is discussed in greater detail by Kreider (2010), Kreider et al. (2012) and Nguimkeu
et al. (2017).
Assuming that the occurrence of real economic shocks is exogenous, I can suppose that S∗i
follows a Bernoulli distribution with parameter p, S∗ ∼ Bern (p).
S∗i =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if p
0 if 1 − p (3)
I assume that the researcher observes the reported shock Si with Si = di,S∗ + S∗i where I deﬁne
21Evidence is rather inconclusive in that regard as it has been found that longer recall period does not
necessarily lead to more errors (Meyer et al. 2018). Bound et al. (2001) suggest that it is the complexity of
a given experience over time rather than the passage of time that is related to misreporting, with salient and
frequent events more easily remembered than irregular events.
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di,S∗ as:
di,S∗ = 1(y∗i ⩾ n ∩ S∗i = 0) − 1(y∗i ⩽m ∩ S∗i = 1) (4)
with 1(.) is the indicator function. Essentially, di,S∗ is a function that introduces misreporting in
my model. The continuous latent variable y∗ represents the ability/willingness of the respondents
to correctly report the economic shocks they experienced in a given year. More speciﬁcally, false
positive cases arise (S∗i = 0 and di,S∗ = 1 such that Si = 1) when y∗ is larger or equal to a
certain cutoﬀ n, with n > 0, which represents the threshold that determines the proportion of
false positive reports in my sample. Similarly, a false negative report, which is characterized by
S∗i = 1 and di,S∗ = −1 such that Si = 0, occurs when y∗ ⩽ m, with m < 0, m representing the
cutoﬀ that determines the rate of false negative reports.
I deﬁne y∗i with a linear function as:
y∗i = w′iγ + ui (5)
with ui ∼ N (0,1) and wi a vector of observable individual reporting characteristics that deter-
mines respondents' likelihood to falsely report economic shocks.
To go back to my original equation, the researcher estimates:
Hi = α1Si +X ′iα2 + i (6)
where I plugged in S∗i = Si − di,S∗ . This means that i = νi + (S∗i − Si)α1 = νi − α1di,S∗ . Clearly,
the OLS estimator is biased if E(i∣X,S) = E(νi − α1di,S∗ ∣X,S) ≠ 0.
In the case where there is no misreporting, then the OLS estimator will be unbiased. This
can be seen by setting S = S∗ such that di,S∗ = 0 and thus E(νi − α1di,S∗ ∣X,S) = E(νi∣X,S) =
E(νi∣X,S∗) = 0 by assumption.
If there is misreporting and it is exogenous in the sense that the factors that explain mis-
reporting are not correlated with the unobservable variable in the structural equation, that is
corr(y∗i , νi) = 0 with E(νi∣X,S∗) = 0, then E(νi −di,S∗α1∣X,S) = E(νi∣X,S)−α1E(di,S∗ ∣X,S) =−α1E(di,S∗ ∣X,S). The measurement error in the independent variable is part of the error term,
which creates a bias. Like in the classical measurement error, one can see that in case of exoge-
nous misreporting, the bias will attenuate the OLS estimator. Indeed, given that di,S∗ and S
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are positively correlated, and that the true α1 is negative by assumption, then there is αˆ1 > α1,
that is, there exists an attenuation bias in this case.
Misreporting is endogenous when corr(y∗i , νi) ≠ 0, that is when the reporting characteristics
of individuals, observable or not, are correlated with variables that are uncontrolled for in Eq.
1 and that explain both Hi and Si. Indeed, when corr(y∗i , νi) ≠ 0, then E(νi∣Si) ≠ 0 because
of y∗i . In that case, the estimates that results from regressing Hi on Si will be biased. I show
in the Online Appendix I that the asymptotic bias in case of endogenous misreporting can be
written as:
plim(αˆ − α) = Γ − αΛ
Θ
(7)
where the direction of the bias is determined by the sign of the numerator. As shown in Nguimkeu
et al. (2017) and detailed in the Online Appendix, both attenuation bias and expansion bias can
occur. There can even be cases where the OLS estimates can have the wrong sign.
I provide two ways to empirically address the issue of misreporting. The ﬁrst approach,
which is a more heuristic one, relies on restricting my sample to mothers with similar reporting
characteristics. The second approach exploits the structure of the model above and attempts to
identify the respondents who are the most likely to falsely report negative economic shocks by
trying to predict y∗i .
The ﬁrst technique I put in place to address this issue of self-reported shocks is to include in
my sample respondents with the same unobserved "reporting" characteristics. Intuitively, it is
possible that mothers who report no shocks at all between 2003 and 2008 are diﬀerent from those
who report 7 shocks (the maximum number) in the same period, not only in terms of observed
characteristics xi, but also in terms of uncontrolled reporting characteristics y∗i . To control
for these reporting characteristics, I follow Currie et al. (2018) and restrict my study sample
to mothers who report a given number of shocks between 2003 and 2008, thereby including in
sample only mothers with the same reporting patterns.
More speciﬁcally, I deﬁne as B the set of observations that are included in my analysis. So
far, B was composed of all the mothers in MLSFH who gave birth between 2003 and 2008,
irrespective of their number of shocks reported, that is:
B1 = {i ∶ 1[0 ⩽ ∣smi ∣ ⩽ 7] = 1} (8)
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where B1 is the set of observations included in my analysis and smi the number of shocks reported
by the mother m of child i between 2003 and 2008. In my benchmark sample, I included in B1
mothers who reported 0 to 7 shocks. The idea is now to sequentially restrict my study sample to
mothers with similar number of shocks reported, such that their reporting style becomes more
and more similar as the restriction becomes more binding. I therefore deﬁne others Bi with
i = {2,3,4,5} as
B2 = {i ∶ 1[1 ⩽ ∣smi ∣ ⩽ 7] = 1} (9)
B3 = {i ∶ 1[1 ⩽ ∣smi ∣ ⩽ 4] = 1} (10)
B4 = {i ∶ 1[2 ⩽ ∣smi ∣ ⩽ 7] = 1} (11)
B5 = {i ∶ 1[2 ⩽ ∣smi ∣ ⩽ 4] = 1} (12)
B2 restricts my study sample to mothers who reported over the period 2003-2008 between 1 and
7 shocks whereas B3 restricts it to mothers who reported between 1 and 4 shocks. Compared
to B2, B4 increases the lower bound to at least 2 and B5 restricts the analysis to mothers
who reported between 2 and 4 economic shocks from 2003 to 2008. My analysis thus relies
on the assumption that mothers who experience similar number of reported shocks between
2003 and 2008 but not during the years they have given birth serve as an appropriate control
group to mothers who did experience negative economic shocks the year of childbirth22. In
terms of the model above, these restrictions drop observations with extreme values of y∗i so that
1(w′iγ + ui ⩾ n) and 1(w′iγ + ui ⩽ m) never occur; that is, I restrict my set of mothers to those
who have reporting characteristics m ⩽ y∗i ⩽ n, whatever the value of S∗ is, which guarantees
that S = S∗.
Table 8 reports the results of this analysis using set of controls 123. Column 1 shows the
results including all i ∈ {B1}, which are the results in my benchmark speciﬁcation in Columns 1
of Tables 4 and 5. Column 2 includes i ∈ {B2}. Discarding in my analysis the 31 children whose
mothers have not reported any shocks between 2003 and 2008 does not aﬀect my estimates.
Further restricting my sample to mothers in B3 leads to an increase of the detrimental eﬀects of
22One possible limitation of this analysis is that mothers who did not experience a negative economic shock at
childbirth actually experienced that extra shock after childbirth and not before it. And because economic shocks
after birth are more likely to have negative impacts on child health than shocks occurring prior to the year of
birth, the results I get from this analysis are likely to underestimate the true diﬀerence in child health between
children who did and those who did not experience a shock at birth.
23Results are similar when using set of controls 2 and 3. Table J.1 in the Online Appendix J presents these
results.
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Table 8: Eﬀects of negative economic shocks on objective
measures of health using various set of mothers
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weight -.336∗∗ -.323∗∗ -.357∗∗ -.307∗ -.352∗
(.164) (.164) (.167) (.184) (.187)
Height -.705 -.788 -.916∗ -.842 -.997∗
(.539) (.536) (.540) (.593) (.598)
Obs. 789 758 725 621 588
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in paren-
theses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The results are
derived using the set of controls 1. B1 corresponds to my
benchmark sample. B2 restricts my sample to mothers who
experienced at least one shock between 2003 and 2008. B3
includes mothers who have experienced at least one shock
but less than 5 and B4 restricts my analysis to mothers who
experienced at least 2 shocks. B5 includes only mothers who
reported between 2 and 4 negative shocks between 2003 and 2008.
economic shocks on weight and height from about 330 to 360 grams and 0.7 to 0.9 centimeters.
Unlike previous results, the latter eﬀect is now statistically signiﬁcant at 90% conﬁdence. Finally,
when I restrict my sample to children whose mothers have reported at least 2 shocks to a
maximum of 7 shocks (B4, Column 4) and 4 shocks (B5, Column 5), one can see that the
estimates barely change. This analysis suggests that my results are robust to diﬀerent reporting
patterns and that self-report bias might be relatively modest in my setting.
The strategy above relies on the assumption that by restricting my sample to mothers who
report similar numbers of shocks between 2003 and 2008, I am eﬀectively able to ensure that
they have identical reporting styles. This presumably allows to control for reporting patterns
and therefore isolate the eﬀects of negative economic shocks on children who experienced a
shock at birth relative to those who did not. Another approach to assess whether my results are
robust to misreporting is to explicitly model misreporting by allowing observed and unobserved
characteristics of the mothers to explain true and false (positive and negative) reports24. The
model below attempts to give some insights on the eﬀect of endogenous misreporting and its
consequences on the OLS estimator.
24The model that follows is a mix between Nguimkeu et al. (2017), who allow false negative reports in their
model (one sided model) and Kreider (2010) who estimates conservative lower bounds of the OLS estimates by
allowing small fractions of self-reports to be in error.
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More speciﬁcally, the way I proceed to correct for endogenous misreporting bias is to change
the reporting status of mothers with "unusual" reporting patterns, in the sense that w′iγ+ui ⩽m
and w′iγ + ui ⩾ n25. This is similar in spirit to Kreider (2010) who identiﬁed conservative
bounds estimates by changing the reporting status of respondents of the same particular type
by hypothetically assuming the knowledge of their misreporting.
Given the assumptions of the model, I can write the probability of reporting or not reporting
a shock as:
P (Si = 1) = P (S∗i = 1 ∩w′iγ + ui >m) + P (S∗i = 0 ∩w′iγ + ui ⩾ n) (13)
P (Si = 0) = P (S∗i = 0 ∩w′iγ + ui < n) + P (S∗i = 1 ∩w′iγ + ui ⩽m) (14)
Because I assume that S∗i ⊥ ui and S∗ ∼ Bern (p), I can represent the above expressions as:
P (Si = 1) = p(1 −Φ(m −w′iγ)) + (1 − p)(1 −Φ(n −w′iγ)) = Pi(p, γ ∶m,n) (15)
P (Si = 0) = (1 − p)Φ(n −w′iγ) + pΦ(m −w′iγ) = 1 − Pi(p, γ ∶m,n) (16)
where I assume that ui follows a standard normal distribution, i.e., Φ(.) is the cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
The likelihood function of this model is therefore:
ln(p, γ ∶m,n) = N∏
i=1Pi(p, γ ∶m,n)Si (1 − Pi(p, γ ∶m,n)1−Si (17)
from which I can derive the log-likelihood function:
Ln(p, γ ∶m,n) = ln(ln(p, γ ∶m,n)) = N∑
i=1Si lnPi(p, γ ∶m,n) + (1 − Si) ln(1 − Pi(p, γ ∶m,n))
(18)
From this expression, I can estimate the probability of truly experiencing an economic shock p,
that I denote by pˆ. pˆ represents the value that maximizes the likelihood of observing the vector S
while allowing for a proportion of false negative (m) and false positive (n) reports in the reported
negative economic shocks. I choose values of m and n so as to allow for 0, 1, 2, 5 and 10% of
false positive reports and 0, 2, 5, 10 and 20% of false negative reports, as false negative reporting
25One way to assess the robustness of my ﬁndings to exogenous misreporting would be to randomly select
observations in my sample and change their shock status.
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is usually more likely than false positive report (Meyer et al. 2018, Nguimkeu et al. 2017)26. The
variables in the vector w are variables for which the extreme values predict the respondent's
untruthful reporting. The upper tail of the y∗ distribution should reﬂect individuals who falsely
report the occurrence of negative economic shocks when none have occurred and the lower
tail represents individuals with false negative reports, that is individuals who did experience
economic shocks but report that they did not.
The ﬁrst variable I include in w is the diﬀerence between the average number of shocks per
interview reported by the respondent's interviewer and the average number of shocks reported
by all the other interviewers. The idea is that interviewers have an eﬀect on the reporting
pattern of the respondents and any deviation from the average might be due to false positive
or false negative reports. For instance, an interviewer whose respondents report on average a
higher number of shocks per interview than other interviewers is more likely to have some of
his or her respondents report shocks that did not occur (false positive). On the other hand,
a very low average rate of reported shocks per interview for a given interviewer compared to
others is correlated with the probability of the interviewer's respondents falsely reporting the
nonoccurrence of a shock (false negative)27.
The second variable I include in the vector w is the number of "Don't know" and "Can't
remember" responses the respondents have used to answer the questions from all the modules
in the survey. The rationale behind this variable is that individuals with many of such answers
are more likely to not report a shock that did occur (false negative) than respondents with fewer
"Don't know" and "Can't remember" answers. On the other hand, respondents with few of such
answers are more likely to report shocks even though they did not occur (false positive).
The same idea applies to my third variable that exploits a question at the very end of
the survey that asks the interviewers to evaluate the degree of cooperation of the respondent
during the interview as compared to other respondents, on a scale of 1 ("Bad") to 4 ("Very
good"). Respondents with a high level of cooperation are assumed to be more likely to report
false positive shocks while the opposite is true for those with a low degree of cooperation. I
standardize these three variables to put them on the same scale and to guarantee that yˆ∗ follows
a distribution that is close to N (0,1).
26Note that in the case of no false negative reports, I have m = −∞ such that P (Si = 0) = (1 − p)Φ(n −w′iγ).
In the case of no false positive reports, n = +∞ and P (Si = 1) = p(1 −Φ(m −w′iγ)). The case where there is no
false positive nor false negative reports corresponds to the benchmark case.
27It is worth noting that interviewers were randomly allocated to respondents.
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The strategy to account for misreporting in my estimation is to change the shock status of
those who are the most likely to false negatively or false positively report a shock. To do so, after
estimating pˆ from the maximum likelihood function above, I compute the number of individuals
for which I have to change the shock status, Ri,j with i = {0,2,5,10,20} corresponding to the
rate of false negative and j = {0,1,2,5,10} the rate of false positive reports, such that the new
vector S, that I denote by S′, has a rate of shocks equal to pˆ with:
pˆ = NS′=1
N
= NS∗=1
N
(19)
Obviously, R0,0 = 0. For cases where there is no mix of false positive and false negative reports,
i.e., R0,. and R.,0, I compute R as:
R = ∣p − pˆ∣ ×N (20)
with N as the number of observations in my sample and p = NS=1N as the proportion of individuals
who self-reported experiencing a negative shock. I then change the shock status of the R.,0
individuals at the left tail of the yˆ∗ = w′iγˆ distribution if S = 0 (false negative), and change the
shock status of the R0,. individuals at the right tail of the yˆ∗ = w′iγˆ distribution if S = 1 (false
positive), starting in both cases from the most extreme values.
In cases where both false positive and false negative reports are present, i.e., when Ri,j with
i = {2,5,10,20} and j = {1,2,5,10}, I compute Ri,j as:
Ri,j =max(Ri,0,R0,j) +R′i,j (21)
with R′i,j = ∣p − pˆ∣ ×N for every pair of i and j, [2,5,10,20] × [1,2,5,10]. The reason I take the
max(.) is because the false positive and false negative reports cancel each other out in S′, so
that R′i,j does not reﬂect the real number of misreports28. By taking max(Ri,0,R0,j), I follow
a more conservative approach and make sure that the number of false reports is at least as big
as Ri,0 and R0,j for each corresponding i and j. I therefore change the shock status of at least
max(Ri,0,R0,j) individuals on both ends of the y∗ distribution. By adding R′i,j to the max(.)
function in Eq. 21, I make sure that after changing the shock status of these Ri,j individuals,
the newly created shock vector S′ equals S∗, i.e., pˆ = NS′=1N = NS∗=1N .
28If the number of false positive and false negative reports is identical, then pˆ = NS′=1
N
= NS=1
N
= p.
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Table K.1 in the Online Appendix K reports the estimates of p that I derive from my
maximum likelihood function using the three variables in w I described above29. Not surprisingly,
as the rate of false positive reporting increases (Columns), the probability of "truly" experiencing
an economic shocks decreases, whereas that same probability increases when the rate of false
negative report goes up (Rows). When both false positive and false negative reports occur, the
eﬀects cancel each other out so that the pˆ estimated in the diagonal elements of the p-matrix
are close to the case where there is no misreporting (ﬁrst cell in the p-matrix).
Panels A and B of Table 9 report OLS estimates of the eﬀects of economic shocks on weight
and height, respectively, after changing the shock status of Ri,j respondents at the tails of yˆ∗
to take endogenous misreporting into account. The ﬁrst cells of Panels A and B in Table 9 are
my benchmark estimates and corresponds to the case where there is no false positive and false
negative reports. When allowing for false positive reports (Columns) to be at maximum 5% and
false negative reports (Rows) to be at maximum 10%, one can see in Panel A that the eﬀects of
S′ on weight are robust and fairly precisely estimated, with eﬀects of economic shocks on weight
ranging from about 200 to 450 grams. However, when allowing for higher rates of false positive
and false positive reports, the negative eﬀect of shocks disappears.
Similarly for my estimates of S′ on height in the second panel of Table 9: the eﬀects of
negative economic shocks seem to be quite robust for low rates of false reports, with an eﬀect
ranging from 0.2 to 0.7 centimeters. However, the negative eﬀect disappears when allowing
higher rates of misreporting. Note that, as was the case in my benchmark speciﬁcation, these
eﬀects are not precisely estimated and fail to be statistically signiﬁcant.
The estimates above use my ﬁrst set of control variables as regressors in the OLS estimations.
Table K.2 for weight and Table K.3 for height in the Online Appendix K show that the results
above are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables in my econometric speciﬁcation
(set of control variables 3), which reduces my sample of observations from 775 to 629.
Overall, my results on the negative eﬀects of economic shocks at birth on weight and height
appear to be robust to misreporting as long as the rates of false positive and false negative reports
remain relatively low. It is worth noting that, unsurprisingly, the negative eﬀects disappear when
these rates increase given the conservative approach that I put in place. Indeed, in the case where
I allow 10% of false positive and 20% of false negative reports, this amounts to changing the
29Note that the results below are derived using my ﬁrst set of control variables and are based on a sample of
775 observations. The diﬀerence in the number of observations is due to missing information in the variables in
w.
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Table 9: Eﬀects of S′i on weight and height
Rate of false positive
A. Eﬀects of economic shocks on weight
0% 1% 2% 5% 10%
Rate of false negative
0% -0.3280∗∗ -0.3134∗ -0.3755∗∗ -0.2678 -0.2746
(0.1669) (0.1714) (0.1743) (0.1794) (0.1921)
2% -0.4188∗∗∗ -0.4535∗∗∗ -0.4850∗∗∗ -0.2555 0.0393
(0.1553) (0.1640) (0.1686) (0.1726) (0.1948)
5% -0.4427∗∗∗ -0.3960∗∗ -0.4341∗∗∗ -0.4177∗∗ -0.0500
(0.1552) (0.1632) (0.1672) (0.1738) (0.1987)
10% -0.3780∗∗ -0.1936 -0.2924∗ -0.3351∗∗ 0.0160
(0.1567) (0.1742) (0.1758) (0.1807) (0.1977)
20% -0.2333 -0.0014 0.0063 -0.0857 0.0236
(0.1548) (0.1713) (0.1737) (0.1770) (0.1807)
B. Eﬀects of economic shocks on height
0% 1% 2% 5% 10%
Rate of false negative
0% -0.5222 -0.4377 -0.6545 -0.2969 -0.2469
(0.5404) (0.5360) (0.5439) (0.5570) (0.5760)
2% -0.7134 -0.3160 -0.4812 -0.1362 -0.0712
(0.4941) (0.5802) (0.5860) (0.5848) (0.6416)
5% -0.4828 -0.3478 -0.3894 -0.2513 0.0114
(0.5617) (0.5550) (0.5715) (0.5777) (0.6228)
10% -0.4258 -0.3168 -0.3389 -0.4354 -0.0112
(0.5503) (0.5356) (0.5422) (0.5610) (0.6013)
20% -0.2484 -0.1316 -0.0139 -0.0526 0.1001
(0.5258) (0.5161) (0.5155) (0.5382) (0.5644)
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Estimated eﬀects
of S′ on weight (Panel A) and height (Panel B), allowing for diﬀerent rates of false positive reports (Columns) and false
negative reports (Rows), using set of controls 1. The sample is based on 775 observations.
shock status of 75 children on the left tail of the y∗ distribution (from 0 to 1, that is false negative
reports) and 95 children on the right tail of the y∗ distribution (from 1 to 0, that is false positive
reports). Out of the 29.29% of children who experienced a shock at birth (ﬁrst cell in Table
K.1), about 42% were therefore considered as not having experienced a shock while about 14%
of those who did not experience a shock were assumed to have experienced one. These changes
represent a signiﬁcant amount of misreporting in the analysis, which explains the diﬀerences in
the results between the cases where I allow for low versus high rates of false positive and false
negative reports.
7 Discussion and conclusion
In this study, I estimate the eﬀects of negative economic shocks during pregnancy or the year
of childbirth on child health in Malawi, a Sub-Saharan African country where poverty is deep
and wide. I show that negative economic shocks have eﬀects on both subjective and objective
measures of child health. More speciﬁcally, I ﬁnd that children who experience a negative
economic shock at birth are about 7 percentage points less likely to be reported to be in excellent
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health and 8 percentage points less likely to be reported to be in much better health than children
of the same sex and age in the same village by their mothers. I show that these eﬀects are robust
to reporting heterogeneity and unobserved mother and household eﬀects that are constant over
children from the same family. I also show that children who experience a shock at birth were
about 300 grams lighter and 0.4 centimeters shorter, although the latter eﬀect fails to be precisely
estimated in some of my speciﬁcations. All these eﬀects are particularly strong for boys.
I also explore the plausibility of the exogeneity of the economic shocks used in my analysis
and issues around the self-reporting of shocks. With regard to the exogeneity assumption, my
dataset allows me to identify shocks that were triggered exogenously independently of mothers'
characteristics and that aﬀected the community as a whole. I show that taking into account
these covariate shocks leads to similar results.
With regards to the fact that shocks are self-reported, I propose a simple model that allows
to control for endogenous misreporting by identifying respondents who are likely to misreport. I
show that changing the shock status of those who are likely to misreport generate similar results,
as long as the rates of false positive and false negative reports are not too high.
My study sheds light on the consequences of negative economic shocks that mothers experi-
ence while pregnant or the year they give birth on child health. This constitutes further evidence
of the intergenerational transmission of poverty and inequality in developing countries (Bhalotra
and Rawlings 2013). These results also highlight the indirect consequences of economic insta-
bility on child health and malnutrition and draw further attention to the particular economic
vulnerability of families living in Malawi, and perhaps more broadly in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Indeed, I believe my ﬁndings speak not only to the Malawian context but also to Sub-Saharan
African countries in general. Malawi shares many socio-economic and socio-demographic char-
acteristics with its neighbouring countries (Chin 2010) and it is likely that negative economic
shocks have identical eﬀects in settings that share similar fragility and vulnerability.
From a policy perspective, my results imply that economic shocks at a speciﬁc time in life can
have long-lasting eﬀects and that families cannot rely on social network and informal safety nets
to protect themselves against shocks that aﬀect the community as a whole. Policies aiming to
protect families with young children and particularly pregnant women against negative economic
shocks can help mitigate the deleterious consequences of these shocks, especially in terms of food
security and health care use. Given the substantial economic costs of undernutrition and the
now demonstrated dramatic beneﬁts of investing in nutrition, where the return for every dollar
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invested can be up to 35 dollars (Shekar et al. 2017), guaranteeing food security to vulnerable
individuals to ensure their healthy development is not only the right thing to do, but it is also
a smart investment. This could improve the well-being of not only the mothers who are subject
to economic shocks but also their children who start their life with lower initial health capital.
This resonates well with the new direction that international organizations such as the World
Bank and the United Nations are taking, when placing human capital development, especially
early in life, at the center of their agendas (The World Bank Group 2018).
33
References
Adhvaryu, Achyuta, Anant Nyshadham, Teresa Molina and Jorge Tamayo . 2018. Helping
children catch up: Early life shocks and the progresa experiment. Technical report. National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Adhvaryu, Achyuta and Anant Nyshadham . 2016. Endowments at birth and parents' invest-
ments in children. The Economic Journal 126(593), 781820.
Aizer, Anna and Janet Currie . 2014. The intergenerational transmission of inequality: Maternal
disadvantage and health at birth. Science 344(6186), 856861.
Almond, Douglas and Bhashkar Mazumder . 2011. Health capital and the prenatal environment:
the eﬀect of ramadan observance during pregnancy. American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics 3(4), 5685.
Almond, Douglas and Bhashkar Mazumder . 2013. Fetal origins and parental responses. Annu.
Rev. Econ. 5(1), 3756.
Almond, Douglas, Bhashkar Mazumder and Reyn Van Ewijk . 2015. In utero ramadan exposure
and children's academic performance. The Economic Journal 125(589), 15011533.
Almond, Douglas, Janet Currie and Valentina Duque . 2017. Childhood circumstances and
adult outcomes: Act ii. Technical report. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Anglewicz, Philip et al. . 2009. The malawi diﬀusion and ideational change project 200406:
Data collection, data quality, and analysis of attrition. Demographic research 20(21), 503.
Bakker, Rachel, Eric AP Steegers, Angelique A Biharie, Johan P Mackenbach, Albert Hofman
and Vincent WV Jaddoe . 2011. Explaining diﬀerences in birth outcomes in relation to
maternal age: the generation r study. BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics &
Gynaecology 118(4), 500509.
Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duﬂo, Gilles Postel-Vinay and Tim Watts . 2010. Long-run health
impacts of income shocks: Wine and phylloxera in nineteenth-century france. The Review of
Economics and Statistics 92(4), 714728.
Barker, David J . 1990. The fetal and infant origins of adult disease.. BMJ: British Medical
Journal 301(6761), 1111.
Barker, David J . 1995. Fetal origins of coronary heart disease.. BMJ: British Medical Journal
311(6998), 171.
Barker, David James Purslove . 1998. Mothers, babies and health in later life. Elsevier Health
Sciences.
Beach, Brian, Joseph P Ferrie and Martin H Saavedra . 2018. Fetal shock or selection? the
1918 inﬂuenza pandemic and human capital development. Technical report. National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Behrman, Jere R and Barbara L Wolfe . 1987. How does mother's schooling aﬀect family
health, nutrition, medical care usage, and household sanitation?. Journal of econometrics
36(1-2), 185204.
Behrman, Jere R and James C Knowles . 1999. Household income and child schooling in viet-
nam. The World Bank Economic Review 13(2), 211256.
34
Bhalotra, Sonia and Samantha Rawlings . 2013. Gradients of the intergenerational transmission
of health in developing countries. Review of Economics and Statistics 95(02), 660672.
Bharadwaj, Prashant, Juan Pedro Eberhard and Christopher A Neilson . 2018. Health at birth,
parental investments, and academic outcomes. Journal of Labor Economics 36(2), 349394.
Bound, John, Charles Brown and Nancy Mathiowetz . 2001. Measurement error in survey data.
In: Handbook of econometrics. Vol. 5. pp. 37053843. Elsevier.
Bozzoli, Carlos and Climent Quintana-Domeque . 2014. The weight of the crisis: evidence from
newborns in argentina. Review of Economics and Statistics 96(3), 550562.
Burlando, Alfredo . 2014. Transitory shocks and birth weights: Evidence from a blackout in
zanzibar. Journal of Development Economics 108, 154168.
Carlson, Kyle . 2015. Fear itself: The eﬀects of distressing economic news on birth outcomes.
Journal of health economics 41, 117132.
Case, Anne and Christina Paxson . 2008a. Height, health, and cognitive function at older ages.
American economic review 98(2), 46367.
Case, Anne and Christina Paxson . 2008b. Stature and status: Height, ability, and labor market
outcomes. Journal of political Economy 116(3), 499532.
Case, Anne and Christina Paxson . 2009. Early life health and cognitive function in old age.
American Economic Review 99(2), 10409.
Case, Anne and Christina Paxson . 2010. Causes and consequences of early-life health. Demog-
raphy 47(1), S65S85.
Case, Anne, Angela Fertig and Christina Paxson . 2005. The lasting impact of childhood health
and circumstance. Journal of health economics 24(2), 365389.
Chen, Lincoln C, AKM Alauddin Chowdhury and Sandra L Huﬀman . 1980. Anthropometric
assessment of energy-protein malnutrition and subsequent risk of mortality among preschool
aged children. The American journal of clinical nutrition 33(8), 18361845.
Chin, Brian . 2010. Income, health, and well-being in rural malawi. Demographic research
23(35), 997.
Coly, Aminata Ndiaye, Jacqueline Milet, Aldiouma Diallo, Tofène Ndiaye, Eric Bénéﬁce, François
Simondon, Salimata Wade and Kirsten B Simondon . 2006. Preschool stunting, adolescent
migration, catch-up growth, and adult height in young senegalese men and women of rural
origin. The Journal of nutrition 136(9), 24122420.
Corman, Hope, Dhaval M Dave and Nancy E Reichman . 2017. Evolution of the infant health
production function. Technical report. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cravioto, J and R Arrieta . 1986. Nutrition, mental development and learning. in Human growth:
A comprehensive treatise. Vol. 2. 2nd ed.. New York: Plenum Press.
Currie, Janet . 2011. Inequality at birth: Some causes and consequences. American Economic
Review 101(3), 122.
Currie, Janet and Douglas Almond . 2011. Human capital development before age ﬁve. In:
Handbook of labor economics. Vol. 4. pp. 13151486. Elsevier.
35
Currie, Janet and Enrico Moretti . 2007. Biology as destiny? short-and long-run determinants
of intergenerational transmission of birth weight. Journal of Labor economics 25(2), 231264.
Currie, Janet and Tom Vogl . 2013. Early-life health and adult circumstance in developing
countries. Annu. Rev. Econ. 5(1), 136.
Currie, Janet, Michael Mueller-Smith and Maya Rossin-Slater . 2018. Violence while in utero:
The impact of assaults during pregnancy on birth outcomes. NBER working paper 24802.
De Onis, Mercedes and Francesco Branca . 2016. Childhood stunting: a global perspective.
Maternal & child nutrition 12, 1226.
De Onis, Mercedes, Monika Blossner, World Health Organization et al. . 1997. Who global
database on child growth and malnutrition. Technical report. Geneva: World Health Orga-
nization.
Devereux, Stephen . 1999. 'making less last longer': informal safety nets in malawi.
Dinkelman, Taryn . 2013. Mitigating long-run health eﬀects of drought: Evidence from south
africa. Technical report. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ellis, Frank, Milton Kutengule and Alfred Nyasulu . 2003. Livelihoods and rural poverty reduc-
tion in malawi. World Development 31(9), 14951510.
Filmer, Deon and Lant Pritchett . 1998. Estimating wealth eﬀects without expenditure dataor
tears: An application to educational enrollments in states of india. policy research working
papers no. 1994..
Fishman, Steven M, Laura E Caulﬁeld, Mercedes De Onis, Monika Blossner, ADNAN A HyDER,
Luke Mullany and Robert E Black . 2004. Childhood and maternal underweight. Comparative
quantiﬁcation of health risks: global and regional burden of disease attributable to selected
major risk factors 1, 39161.
Giertz, Åsa, Jorge Caballero, Margareta Dileva, Diana Galperin and Traci Johnson . 2015. Man-
aging agricultural risk for growth and food security in malawi. Agriculture Global Practice
Note-October 2015; World Bank Group.
Glewwe, Paul, Hanan G Jacoby and Elizabeth M King . 2001. Early childhood nutrition and
academic achievement: a longitudinal analysis. Journal of public economics 81(3), 345368.
Grossman, Michael . 1972. On the concept of health capital and the demand for health. Journal
of Political economy 80(2), 223255.
Heckman, James J . 2006. Skill formation and the economics of investing in disadvantaged
children. Science 312(5782), 19001902.
Hoddinott, John, Harold Alderman, Jere R Behrman, Lawrence Haddad and Susan Horton .
2013. The economic rationale for investing in stunting reduction.Maternal & Child Nutrition
9, 6982.
Huxley, Rachel R, Alistair W Shiell and Catherine M Law . 2000. The role of size at birth and
postnatal catch-up growth in determining systolic blood pressure: a systematic review of the
literature. Journal of hypertension 18(7), 815831.
Hyder, Asma, Jere R Behrman and Hans-Peter Kohler . 2015. Negative economic shocks and
child schooling: Evidence from rural malawi. Development Southern Africa 32(4), 458476.
36
International Monetary Fund . 2017. Malawi - economic development document. IMF Country
Report.
Joanna Briggs et al. . 2012. Best practice information sheet: Women's perceptions and experi-
ences of breastfeeding support.. Nursing & health sciences 14(1), 133.
Kohler, Hans-Peter, Susan C Watkins, Jere R Behrman, Philip Anglewicz, Iliana V Kohler,
Rebecca L Thornton, James Mkandawire, Hastings Honde, Augustine Hawara, Ben Chilima
et al. . 2014. Cohort proﬁle: The malawi longitudinal study of families and health (mlsfh).
International Journal of Epidemiology 44(2), 394404.
Kraemer, Sebastian . 2000. The fragile male. BMJ: British Medical Journal 321(7276), 1609.
Kreider, Brent . 2010. Regression coeﬃcient identiﬁcation decay in the presence of infrequent
classiﬁcation errors. The Review of Economics and Statistics 92(4), 10171023.
Kreider, Brent, John V Pepper, Craig Gundersen and Dean Jolliﬀe . 2012. Identifying the
eﬀects of snap (food stamps) on child health outcomes when participation is endogenous and
misreported. Journal of the American Statistical Association 107(499), 958975.
Lavy, Victor, Analia Schlosser and Adi Shany . 2016. Out of africa: Human capital consequences
of in utero conditions. Technical report. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Maccini, Sharon and Dean Yang . 2009. Under the weather: Health, schooling, and economic
consequences of early-life rainfall. American Economic Review 99(3), 100626.
MacLeod, S and JL Kiely . 1988. The eﬀects of maternal age and parity on birthweight: a
population-based study in new york city. International Journal of Gynecology & Obstetrics
26(1), 1119.
Maonga, Beston B and Keshav Lall Maharjan . 2004. Analysis of traditional pest management
practices in malawi. Journal of Rural Problems 40(1), 143148.
Martorell, Reynaldo . 1999. The nature of child malnutrition and its long-term implications.
Food and nutrition Bulletin 20(3), 288292.
Martorell, Reynaldo, Bernardo L. Horta, Linda S. Adair, Aryeh D. Stein, Linda Richter, Caroline
H.D. Fall, Santosh K. Bhargava, S. K.Dey Biswas, Lorna Perez, Fernando C. Barros, Cesar G.
Victora, Pedro Hallal, Denise Gigante, Manuel Ramirez-Zea, Vinod Kapani, Clive Osmond,
Andrew Wills, Darren Dahly, Christopher W Kuzawa, Harshpal Singh Sachdev, Shane A.
Norris, Mathew Mainwaring and Daniel Lopes . 2009. Weight gain in the ﬁrst two years of
life is an important predictor of schooling outcomes in pooled analyses from ﬁve birth cohorts
from low-and middle-income countries. The Journal of nutrition 140(2), 348354.
Meyer, BD and N Mittag . 2018. Misreporting of government transfers: How important are
survey design and geography. Unpublished manuscript.
Meyer, Bruce D, Nikolas Mittag and Robert M Goerge . 2018. Errors in survey reporting
and imputation and their eﬀects on estimates of food stamp program participation. NBER
Working paper, 25143.
Nandi, Arindam, Sonia Bhalotra, Anil B Deolalikar and Ramanan Laxminarayan . 2017. The hu-
man capital and productivity beneﬁts of early childhood nutritional interventions. In: Child
and Adolescent Health and Development. 3rd edition. The International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development/The World Bank.
37
Neelsen, Sven and Thomas Stratmann . 2011. Eﬀects of prenatal and early life malnutrition:
Evidence from the greek famine. Journal of Health Economics 30(3), 479488.
Nguimkeu, Pierre, Augustine Denteh and Rusty Tchernis . 2017. On the estimation of treat-
ment eﬀects with endogenous misreporting. Technical report. National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Orr, Alastair, Blessings Mwale and Donata Saiti . 2001. Market liberalisation, household food
security and the rural poor in malawi. The European Journal of Development Research
13(1), 4769.
Parman, John . 2015. Childhood health and human capital: New evidence from genetic brothers
in arms. The Journal of Economic History 75(1), 3064.
Paxson, Christina and Norbert Schady . 2005. Child health and economic crisis in peru. The
World bank economic review 19(2), 203223.
Pradhan, Kailash Chandra and Shrabani Mukherjee . 2018. Covariate and idiosyncratic shocks
and coping strategies for poor and non-poor rural households in india. Journal of Quantitative
Economics 16(1), 101127.
Prinz, Daniel, Michael Chernew, David Cutler and Austin Frakt . 2018. Health and economic
activity over the lifecycle: Literature review. Technical report. National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Rohde, Nicholas, Conchita D'Ambrosio and Andrew Clark . 2017. Prenatal economic shocks
and birth outcomes.
Rosenzweig, Mark R and T Paul Schultz . 1982. The behavior of mothers as inputs to child
health: the determinants of birth weight, gestation, and rate of fetal growth. In: Economic
aspects of health. pp. 5392. University of Chicago Press.
Schultz-Nielsen, Marie Louise, Erdal Tekin and Jane Greve . 2016. Labor market eﬀects of
intrauterine exposure to nutritional deﬁciency: Evidence from administrative data on muslim
immigrants in denmark. Economics & Human Biology 21, 196209.
Scott, James C . 1977. The moral economy of the peasant: Rebellion and subsistence in Southeast
Asia. Yale University Press.
Sen, Amartya . 1982. Poverty and famines: an essay on entitlement and deprivation. Oxford
university press.
Shekar, Meera, Jakub Kakietek, Julia Dayton Eberwein and Dylan Walters . 2017. An investment
framework for nutrition: reaching the global targets for stunting, anemia, breastfeeding, and
wasting. The World Bank.
Sievertsen, Hans Henrik and Miriam Wüst . 2017. Discharge on the day of birth, parental
response and health and schooling outcomes. Journal of health economics 55, 121138.
Susser, Mervyn, Francis A Marolla and Joseph Fleiss . 1972. Birth weight, fetal age and perinatal
mortality. American Journal of Epidemiology 96(3), 197204.
Thai, Thuan Q, Mikko Myrskylä et al. . 2012. Rainfall shocks, parental behavior and breast-
feeding: Evidence from rural vietnam. Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research.
The World Bank . 2008. Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births). https://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT.
38
The World Bank Group . 2018. The human capital project. International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development.
Thomas, Duncan and John Strauss . 1992. Prices, infrastructure, household characteristics and
child height. Journal of Development Economics 39(2), 301331.
Thomas, Duncan, John Strauss and Maria-Helena Henriques . 1990. Child survival, height for
age and household characteristics in brazil. Journal of Development Economics 33(2), 197
234.
Van den Berg, Gerard J, Maarten Lindeboom and France Portrait . 2006. Economic conditions
early in life and individual mortality. The American Economic Review 96(1), 290302.
Vyas, Seema and Lilani Kumaranayake . 2006. Constructing socio-economic status indices: how
to use principal components analysis. Health policy and planning 21(6), 459468.
Whincup, Peter H, Samantha J Kaye, Christopher G Owen, Rachel Huxley, Derek G Cook,
Sonoko Anazawa, Elizabeth Barrett-Connor, Santosh K Bhargava, Bryndís E Birgisdottir,
Soﬁa Carlsson et al. . 2008. Birth weight and risk of type 2 diabetes: a systematic review.
Jama 300(24), 28862897.
WHO . 1995. The use and interpretation of anthropometry. Report 8854. World Health Orga-
nization.
39
ONLINE APPENDIX
Appendix A
Table A.1: Marginal eﬀects of negative economic shocks at birth
on subjective health outcomes - Logit regressions
Eﬀects of economic shocks at birth on:
Probability of being (1) (2) (3)
ill in the last 12 months 0.011 0.021 0.019
(0.029) (0.033) (0.032)
ill for more than 1 month 0.016 0.016 0.015
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015)
in very good health -0.016 -0.037 -0.036
( 0.025) (0.029) (0.029)
in excellent health -0.033 -0.070∗∗ -0.073∗∗
(0.028) (0.031) (0.031)
in better health -0.029 -0.058∗ -0.053∗
(0.027) (0.031) (0.031)
in much better health -0.034 -0.083∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.030) (0.030)
Obs. 1784 1382 1380
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Columns 1, 2 and 3 include set of
controls 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
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Table A.2: Marginal eﬀects of negative economic shocks at birth
on subjective health outcomes - Probit regressions
Eﬀects of economic shocks at birth on:
Probability of being (1) (2) (3)
ill in the last 12 months 0.011 0.021 0.019
(0.029) (0.032) (0.032)
ill for more than 1 month 0.015 0.015 0.014
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
in very good health -0.016 -0.036 -0.035
(0.025) (0.029) (0.029)
in excellent health -0.033 -0.070∗∗ -0.074∗∗
(0.027) (0.031) (0.031)
in better health -0.028 -0.057∗ -0.053∗
(0.027) (0.031) (0.031)
in much better health -0.033 -0.081∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.030) (0.030)
Obs. 1784 1382 1380
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Columns 1, 2 and 3 include set of
controls 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
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Appendix B
Table B.1: Estimates of the eﬀects of negative economic
shocks on subjective health measures controlling for mother
ﬁxed eﬀects (linear)
Probability of being: (1) (2) (3)
ill in the last 12 months .003 .010 .009
(.039) (.050) (.050)
ill for more than 1 month .004 -.003 -.003
(.018) (.024) (.024)
in very good health -.042 -.028 -.028
(.031) (.045) (.045)
in excellent health -.042 -.099∗∗ -.103∗∗
(.029) (.040) (.040)
in better health -.009 -.012 -.012
(.034) (.049) (.049)
in much better health -.042 -.073∗∗ -.073∗∗
(.029) (.035) (.035)
Obs. 1203 769 767
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in paren-
theses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Eﬀect of negative
economic shock during the year of birth on subjective health
outcomes controlling for mother ﬁxed eﬀects. Columns 1, 2 and
3 include set of controls 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Estimates of
the other coeﬃcients are available upon request.
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Table B.2: Estimates of the eﬀects (odd-ratios) of negative economic shocks on subjective health
measures controlling for mother ﬁxed eﬀects (logit)
Set of controls 1 Set of controls 2
Odd ratios Conf. Int. (95%) Odd ratios Conf. Int. (95%)
Probability of being: (1) (2) (3) (4)
ill in the last 12 months 1.003 [1.676-0.601] 0.821 [1.695-0.398]
Obs. 406 256
ill for more than 1 month 1.791 [7.288-0.440] n.a. n.a.
Obs. 107 .
in very good health 0.694 [1.290-0.373] 0.856 [1.821-0.403]
Obs. 277 190
in excellent health 0.613 [1.281-0.293] 0.323∗∗ [0.956-0.109]
Obs. 243 154
in better health 0.803 [1.339-0.481] 0.781 [1.507-0.405]
Obs. 318 212
in much better health 0.592 [1.217-0.405] 0.145∗∗ [0.668-0.032]
Obs. 226 137
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Eﬀects
of negative economic shocks during the year of birth on subjective health outcomes controlling for mother
ﬁxed-eﬀect with a logit speciﬁcation by means of conditional likelihood function. Columns 1 and 3 include set
of controls 1 and 2, respectively. The results using set of controls 3 are similar to the ones derived using set of
control 2 as there is no within-mother variation in the variables that are added to the model. Estimates of the
other coeﬃcients are available upon request. There was not enough variation in the "Being ill for more than 1
month" speciﬁcation for it to be estimated when using set of controls 2. Estimates presented are odd-ratios.
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Appendix C
Table C.1: Eﬀects of negative economic shocks at birth on objective health outcomes using
diﬀerent wealth scores
Weight Height
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Wealth measure 1
Economic shock at birth -0.336∗∗ -0.284∗ -0.316∗ -0.705 -0.587 -0.550
(0.164) (0.164) (0.166) (0.539) (0.548) (0.549)
Wealth score -0.130∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗ 0.208 0.156
(0.047) (0.049) (0.168) (0.176)
Obs. 789 769 768 789 769 768
2. Wealth measure 2
Economic shock at birth -0.336∗∗ -0.419∗ -0.473∗∗ -0.705 -1.278∗ -1.288∗
(0.164) (0.228) (0.231) (0.539) (0.700) (0.695)
Wealth score -0.136∗∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.019 -0.026
(0.064) (0.064) (0.154) (0.168)
Obs. 789 487 486 789 487 486
Note: Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01. Columns 1-3 represent the results for weight and Columns 4-6 for height. Wealth measure 1 is
the wealth of the household in 2004, subsequently changing missing values with the wealth level of the
household in 2006 and then in 2008. Wealth measure 2 only takes into account the household wealth
level in 2004, not exploiting the information from the 2006 and 2008 waves.
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Appendix D
Eﬀects on weight-for-age and height-for-age z-scores
One can assess where in the weight and height distributions the eﬀects of negative economic
shocks are taking place using z-scores. Assuming weight and height are normally distributed
in the population, I can estimate the eﬀects of negative economic shocks on weight-for-age and
height-for-age z-scores, as deﬁned as:
zi = mi −Ms,a
sds,a
(D.1)
wheremi is my objective anthropometric measure (weight or height) of child i,Ms,a is the median
and sds,a the standard deviation of m from i's reference group based on sex s and age a in my
sample. Weight-for-age and height-for-age z-scores are widely used anthropometric measures
and deﬁcits in these measures are often seen as evidence of malnutrition (Fishman et al. 2004,
WHO 1995). As an indicator of thinness and wasting, low weight-for-age z-score implies recent
or continuing current severe weight loss and is the strongest anthropometric predictor of child
malnutrition and long-term mortality in developing countries used in the literature (Fishman
et al. 2004, WHO 1995). Low height-for-age reﬂects shortness and stunted growth, which is a
failure to reach optimal health potential. This is often characterized by early and long-term
exposure to adverse conditions due, for instance, to illness and malnutrition (De Onis et al.
1997, WHO 1995).
I derive binary variables that take the value 1 if the z-score in consideration is less than d and
0 otherwise, with d = {−2,−1,0,1,2}. Children with z-scores of weight-for-age and height-for-
age lower than −2 are categorized as suﬀering from moderate to severe undernutrition (De Onis
et al. 1997). More speciﬁcally, childhood stunting, a good indicator of children well-being and
malnutrition (De Onis and Branca 2016), corresponds to a height-for-age z-score below −2 (WHO
1995) and moderate to severe underweight corresponds to a weight-for-age z-score lower than−2. A weight-for-age z-score between −2 and −1 represents the case of children who are mildly
underweight (Fishman et al. 2004).
The ﬁrst panel of Table D.1 reports the results of the eﬀects of economic shocks experienced
by children on their weight-for-age z-score. Column 1 shows the eﬀects of economic shock on the
z-score when considering the z-score as a continuous measure. The table shows that the weight
of the children who experienced a shock at birth is on average about 0.16 standard deviation
lower than the median weight.
When discretizing my continuous measures into categories, Column 2 shows that children
who experienced a shock at birth were 3 percentage points more likely to have a weight that is 2
standard deviations lower than others and this eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%-level30.
The same children were also about 10 percentage points more likely to be lower than median
weight and 3 percentage points more likely to have a weight that is less than +2 standard
deviations above the median. These eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. This
shows that experiencing a negative economic shock at birth results in a shift towards the left
of the weight-for-age z-score distribution. The eﬀect appears to be quite homogeneous along
the weight distribution, although the eﬀects are stronger at the median and are statistically
signiﬁcant only at both ends of the distribution and at the median.
The second panel of Table D.1 shows the results of the same regressions, but looking at
height instead of weight. Negative economic shocks in utero or during the year of birth appear
to have a negative eﬀect on the height-for-age z-score (Column 1) and a positive eﬀect on the
probability of having a z-score that is below the various z-score thresholds. These eﬀects are
30As mentioned above, a weight-for-age z-score of −2 and below characterizes children as being underweight
(De Onis et al. 1997).
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Table D.1: Weight-for-age and height-for-age z-scores, assuming normal
distributions
Z-score <-2 <-1 <0 <1 <2
1. Weight
Set of controls 1 -.168∗∗ .028∗ .027 .088∗∗ .037 .025∗∗∗
(.084) (.016) (.030) (.045) (.030) (.010)
Set of controls 2 -.157∗ .031∗ .020 .105∗∗ .030 .026∗∗
(.090) (.017) (.032) (.048) (.032) (.012)
Set of controls 3 -.169∗ .031∗ .020 .108∗∗ .035 .027∗∗
(.091) (.017) (.032) (.048) (.032) (.012)
2. Height
Set of controls 1 -.124 .011 .049 .066 .046 -.007
(.091) (.014) (.032) (.045) (.033) (.015)
Set of controls 2 -.062 .010 .027 .022 .031 -.013
(.098) (.016) (.032) (.048) (.037) (.018)
Set of controls 3 -.061 .008 .027 .018 .033 -.012
(.099) (.016) (.032) (.048) (.037) (.018)
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Eﬀects of negative economic shocks during the year of
birth on z-score (Column 1) and on dummy variables that take value 1 if z-score
is below d with d = {−2,−1,0,1,2}. The ﬁrst panel looks at the eﬀects on weight
and the second at the eﬀects on height.
however not precisely estimated.
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Table E.1: Eﬀects of negative economic shocks on objec-
tive measures of health, splitting the sample by whether
the mothers have received more or less transfers than the
median value in 2006
Financial and in-kind transfers received (in 2006)
Weight Height
Below Above Below Above
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Set of controls 1 -0.405 -0.215 -0.891 -0.040
(0.283) (0.238) (1.021) (0.670)
Set of controls 2 -0.440 -0.062 -0.557 0.228
(0.321) (0.226) (1.092) (0.677)
Set of controls 3 -0.448 -0.089 -0.595 0.206
(0.324) (0.224) (1.097) (0.672)
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in paren-
theses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. I split my sample
by whether respondents have received informal transfers, be
they ﬁnancial or in-kind, from fewer (Columns 1 and 3) or
more (Columns 2 and 4) persons than the median value in my
sample (in 2006).
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Table F.1: Eﬀects of economic shocks one year before, one year after
and during the year of birth on objective health measures
(1) (2) (3)
1. Weight
Economic shock a year before birth .171 -.026 -.031
(.213) (.222) (.221)
Economic shock at birth -.348∗ -.380∗ -.411∗∗
(.182) (.195) (.196)
Economic shock a year after birth -.115 -.139 -.154
(.168) (.185) (.188)
2. Height
Economic shock a year before birth .649 .685 .662
(.657) (.748) (.754)
Economic shock at birth -.792 -.424 -.438
(.569) (.634) (.639)
Economic shock a year after birth .331 .087 .066
(.520) (.581) (.580)
Obs. 645 524 524
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Columns 1, 2 and 3 include set of controls
1, 2 and 3, respectively. The ﬁrst panel shows the eﬀects of negative
economic shocks on weight for shocks that occur one year prior to birth
(row 1), during the year of birth (second row) and one year after the year
of birth (row 3). The second panel shows the results for height instead
of weight. The sample underlying this speciﬁcation is smaller than in my
previous analyses because shocks reported in wave 5 of MLSFH cover only
the period from 2003 to 2008. I therefore don't know whether those born
in 2003 experienced a shock in 2002 and those born in 2008 experienced a
shock in 2009. I thus discard these observations and keep for this analysis
only children who are born between 2004 and 2007, leading to a reduced
sample size.
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Appendix G
Table G.1: Eﬀects of economic shocks on mortality
Eﬀects on mortality
(1) (2) (3)
Shock at birth .009 -.002 -.001
(.013) (.015) (.014)
Idiosyncratic shock at birth -.004 .001 .001
(.018) (.021) (.021)
Common shock at birth .020 .004 .005
(.016) (.017) (.016)
Obs. 1939 1510 1508
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in
parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Age of the
children is not controlled for in these regressions. Sample
consists of 1939 children, 1808 are alive and 131 are dead
(6.76%) in 2008. Idiosyncratic shocks are shocks aﬀecting the
household of the respondents only. Common shocks are shocks
that aﬀect other households as well, as deﬁned in Table 2.
Regressions are conducted separately for each type of shocks
(rows).
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Table H.1: Eﬀects of covariate shocks on objective health outcomes for various levels of negative economic shocks, including set
of controls 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Weight
Covariate shocks -.106 -.021 -.074
(.196) (.223) (.246)
Poor crop yields,loss of crops due to disease or pests .117 .198 -.179
(.238) (.280) (.351)
Big change in price of grain -.200 -.206 .070
(.239) (.266) (.265)
2. Height
Covariate shocks -.437 -.995 -1.073
(.639) (.714) (.812)
Poor crop yields, loss of crops due to disease or pests -.183 -.673 -1.159
(.702) (.813) (1.128)
Big change in price of grain -.453 -.566 -.463
(.852) (.944) (.978)
Including shocks aﬀecting only HH y y
Excluding shocks aﬀecting only HH y y
Including only shocks aﬀecting most or all HH in community only y y
Obs. 639 639 639 639 6339 639
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. These regressions include set of
controls 2. Covariate shock is a dummy variable that combines shocks due to poor crop yields/disease/pest and those due to big changes
in price of grain. Columns 1 and 2 include shocks aﬀecting all households, including those that have aﬀected only the household of the
respondents. Columns 3 and 4 exclude shocks that have aﬀected only the household of the respondents. Columns 5 and 6 take into
account only shocks that have aﬀected most or all households in the community.
Table H.2: Eﬀects of covariate shocks on objective health outcomes for various levels of negative economic shocks, including set
of controls 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Weight
Covariate shocks -.132 -.061 -.124
(.197) (.225) (.244)
Poor crop yields,loss of crops due to disease or pests .101 .155 -.259
(.237) (.279) (.345)
Big change in price of grain -.221 -.217 .067
(.238) (.268) (.261)
2. Height
Covariate shocks -.433 -1.009 -1.093
(.642) (.716) (.815)
Poor crop yields, loss of crops due to disease or pests -.184 -.700 -1.232
(.706) (.815) (1.139)
Big change in price of grain -.444 -.546 -.430
(.859) (.959) (.992)
Including shocks aﬀecting only HH y y
Excluding shocks aﬀecting only HH y y
Including only shocks aﬀecting most or all HH in community only y y
Obs. 639 639 639 639 639 639
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. These regressions include set of
controls 3. Covariate shock is a dummy variable that combines shocks due to poor crop yields/disease/pest and those due to big changes
in price of grain. Columns 1 and 2 include shocks aﬀecting all households, including those that have aﬀected only the household of the
respondents. Columns 3 and 4 exclude shocks that have aﬀected only the household of the respondents. Columns 5 and 6 take into
account only shocks that have aﬀected most or all households in the community.
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The derivation of the asymptotic bias in case of endogenous misreporting follows closely Nguimkeu
et al. (2017) and the results they derive in their one-sided model. I know from Eq. 6 and the
Frisch-Waugh theorem that
MH = α1MS +M (I.1)
where I omit the subscript X on the projection matrix M for ease of notation (MX). It follows
that the OLS estimator of α1 is:
αˆ1 = (S′MS)−1S′MH (I.2)
where I use the idempotence of the projection matrix M and the fact that M = M ′. Plugging
in the expression for MH in Eq. I.2 and rearranging yields:
αˆ1 − α1 = (S′MS)−1S′M (I.3)
Taking the expectation, I then get:
E(αˆ1 − α1∣X,S) = (S′MS)−1S′ME(i∣X,S) ≠ 0 (I.4)
as explained above due to both E(νi∣X,S) ≠ 0 and −α1E(di,S∗ ∣X,S)) ≠ 0.
To determine the inconsistency of the OLS estimator, I can express the above expression as:
αˆ1 − α1 = (S′MS)−1S′M (I.5)
αˆ1 − α1 = (S′MS
N
)−1 S′M
N
(I.6)
αˆ1 − α1 = ( S′MS
N´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
1O
)−1( S′Mν
N´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
2O
− S′Mαd
N´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
3O
) (I.7)
I derive now each of the three terms on the right hand side of Eq. I.7, starting with 1O.
1O = S′MS
N
= S′[I −X(X ′X)−1X ′]S
N
= S′S
N
− S′X(X ′X)−1X ′S
N
(I.8)
which, following the Weak Law of Large Numbers and the Slutsky theorem, leads to
1O
p→ E(S2i ) −E(Six′i)E(xix′i)−1E(Sixi) (I.9)
and then, using the Continuous Mapping theorem, I know that:
1O−1 = (S′MS
N
)−1 p→ [E(S2i ) −E(Six′i)E(xix′i)−1E(Sixi)]−1 (I.10)
Similarly, 2O can be written as follows:
2O = S′Mν
N
p→ E(Siνi) −E(Six′i)E(xix′i)−1E(xiνi) = E(Siνi) (I.11)
where I use the fact that E(xiνi) = E(xi)E(νi) = 0. To deﬁne E(Siνi), I remember that
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Si = 1(w′iγ + ui ⩾ n ∩ S∗i = 0) − 1(w′iγ + ui ⩽m ∩ S∗i = 1) + S∗i so that:
E(Siνi) = E(νi1(w′iγ + ui ⩾ n ∩ S∗i = 0) − νi1(w′iγ + ui ⩽m ∩ S∗i = 1) + νiS∗i ) (I.12)= E((1 − p)Pr(ui ⩾ n −w′iγ)E(νi∣ui ⩾ n −w′iγ) − pPr(ui ⩽m −w′iγ)E(νi∣ui ⩽m −w′iγ))
(I.13)
where I use the exogeneity of S∗i , the law of iterated expectations and the fact that E(νi) = 0.
I assume (νiui) ∼ N(0,Σ) with Σ = ( σ2ν δσνσuδσνσu σ2u ) and corr(νi, ui) = δ. After some arrange-
ments, Eq. I.13 simpliﬁes to:
E(Siνi) = E[(1 − p)δσνφ(n −w′iγ
σu
) + pδσνφ(m −w′iγ
σu
)] (I.14)
such that
2O = S′Mνi
N
p→ E(Siνi) = E[(1 − p)δσνφ(n −w′iγ
σu
) + pδσνφ(m −w′iγ
σu
)] (I.15)
Turning now to 3O, I have
3O = αS′Md
N
= αS′[I −X(X ′X)−1X ′]d
N
(I.16)
= αS′d
N
− αS′X(X ′X)−1X ′d
N
(I.17)
p→ αE(Sidi) − αE(Six′i)E(xix′i)−1E(dix′i) (I.18)
This leads to:
plim(αˆ − α) = E[(1 − p)δσνφ(n−w′iγσu ) + pδσνφ(m−w′iγσu )] − α[E(Sidi) −E(Six′i)E(xix′i)−1E(dix′i)]
E(S2i ) −E(Six′i)E(xix′i)−1E(Sixi)
(I.19)
In case of endogenous misreporting, both attenuation bias and expansion bias can occur. As
detailed below and discussed in Nguimkeu et al. (2017), there can even be cases where the OLS
estimates can have the wrong sign.
Because by assumption α is negative, attenuation bias exists when plim(αˆ − α) > 0 and
expansion bias exists when plim(αˆ − α) < 0. There are also cases where αˆ < 0 < α or αˆ > 0 > α,
that is, OLS estimates can have the wrong sign. To see this, rewrite Eq. I.19 as:
plim(αˆ − α) = Γ − αΛ
Θ
(I.20)
Because the denominator Θ is positive (by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality), the direction of the
bias is determined by the sign of the numerator.
First, one can show that expansion (attenuation) bias occurs if ΓΛ < (>)α and Λ > (<)0 or
when Λ < (>)0 and ΓΛ > (<)α. One can also show that αˆ and α can have opposite signs. Again,
assuming that α < 0, then αˆ > 0 if Γ > 0 and 0 > α > ΓΛ−Θ with Θ−Λ > 0. In case Θ−Λ < 0, then
α will have to be smaller than ΓΛ−Θ for αˆ to have the opposite sign of α. It is worth noting that
these last conditions can be met in my setting. Recall that Γ = E(Siνi), such that Γ > 0 holds if
δ = corr(νi, ui) > 0. This can potentially be the case as unobserved factors in Eq. 1 that explain
poor health can be positively correlated with factors that explain misreporting behaviors31.
31It is interesting to note that the sign switching region basically depends on the size of Γ
Λ−Θ . One can show
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that ∂ζ
∂δ
> 0, ∂ζ
∂σ2
> 0, ∂ζ
∂m
> 0 and ∂ζ
∂n
< 0 with ζ = Γ
Λ−Θ .
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Table J.1: Eﬀects of negative economic shocks on objective measures of
health using various sets of mothers and sets of control variables
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Set of controls 2
Weight -.325∗ -.301∗ -.342∗ -.264 -.320∗
(.173) (.173) (.176) (.190) (.193)
Height -.355 -.389 -.530 -.420 -.594
(.583) (.581) (.582) (.644) (.646)
Obs. 639 613 588 502 477
2. Set of controls 3
Weight -.353∗∗ -.324∗ -.370∗∗ -.295 -.358∗
(.175) (.174) (.176) (.190) (.192)
Height -.356 -.379 -.522 -.428 -.614
(.588) (.585) (.587) (.650) (.653)
Obs. 639 613 588 502 477
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The results are derived using the set of controls
2 (ﬁrst panel) and 3 (second panel). B1 corresponds to my benchmark
sample. B2 restricts my sample to mothers who experienced at least one
shock between 2003 and 2008. B3 includes mothers who have experienced
at least one shock but less than 5 and B4 restricts my analysis to mothers
who experienced at least 2 shocks. B5 includes only mothers who reported
between 2 and 4 negative shocks between 2003 and 2008.
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Appendix K
Table K.1: Probabilities of experiencing negative economic shocks, allowing for misreporting
Rate of false positive
Estimates of the parameter p, pˆ 0% 1% 2% 5% 10%
Rate of false negative
0% 0.2929∗∗∗ 0.2629∗∗∗ 0.2545∗∗∗ 0.2333∗∗∗ 0.1964∗∗∗
(0.0163) (0.0181) (0.0183) (0.0185) (0.0186)
2% 0.3339∗∗∗ 0.2840∗∗∗ 0.2710∗∗∗ 0.2445∗∗∗ 0.2043∗∗∗
(0.0196) (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0185) (0.0190)
5% 0.3430∗∗∗ 0.3013∗∗∗ 0.2873∗∗∗ 0.2580∗∗∗ 0.2145∗∗∗
(0.0202) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0191) (0.0196)
10% 0.3569∗∗∗ 0.3237∗∗∗ 0.3097∗∗∗ 0.2787∗∗∗ 0.2314∗∗∗
(0.0209) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0201) (0.0209)
20% 0.3879∗∗∗ 0.3653∗∗∗ 0.3524∗∗∗ 0.3204∗∗∗ 0.2683∗∗∗
(0.0221) (0.0216) (0.0219) (0.0226) (0.0239)
Note: Estimated probabilities of experiencing a negative economic shock, allowing for diﬀerent rates of false
positive reports (Columns) and false negative reports (Rows). These probabilities are estimated with maximum
likelihood using set of controls 1. The sample is based on 775 observations.
Table K.2: Eﬀects of S′i on weight, including set of controls 3
Rate of false positive
Eﬀects of economic shocks on weight
0% 1% 2% 5% 10%
Rate of false negative
0% -0.3703∗∗ -0.4788∗∗∗ -0.4350∗∗ -0.4278∗∗ -0.4435∗∗
(0.1771) (0.1790) (0.1817) (0.1877) (0.1904)
2% -0.4111∗∗ -0.4255∗∗ -0.4374∗∗ -0.4920∗∗ -0.1200
(0.1665) (0.1768) (0.1789) (0.1812) (0.2228)
5% -0.3879∗∗ -0.2557 -0.4266∗∗ -0.5297∗∗∗ -0.0848
(0.1676) (0.1932) (0.1755) (0.1794) (0.2137)
10% -0.2871∗ -0.2138 -0.2175 -0.3104 -0.0471
(0.1725) (0.1874) (0.1886) (0.1905) (0.2081)
20% -0.1467 0.0965 -0.0112 -0.0779 -0.2032
(0.1766) (0.1854) (0.1876) (0.1899) (0.1994)
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Estimated
eﬀect of S′ on weight, allowing for diﬀerent rates of false positive reports (Columns) and false negative reports (Rows),
using set of controls 3. The sample is based on 629 observations and the estimations include set of controls 3.
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Table K.3: Eﬀects of S′i on height, including set of controls 3
Rate of false positive
Eﬀects of economic shocks on height
0% 1% 2% 5% 10%
Rate of false negative
0% -0.5222 -0.3135 -0.3625 -0.1762 -0.4306
(0.5404) (0.5458) (0.5469) (0.5590) (0.5769)
2% -0.4683 -0.2479 -0.3302 0.0995 0.1228
(0.5809) (0.5868) (0.5916) (0.5906) (0.6461)
5% -0.5093 -0.1431 -0.3413 -0.2778 0.3027
( 0.5675) (0.5628) (0.5745) (0.5777) (0.6264)
10% -0.3980 -0.1056 0.0220 -0.3276 0.2446
(0.5566) (0.5458) (0.5510) (0.5614) (0.6028)
20% -0.3061 -0.2847 -0.4790 -0.1342 0.2437
(0.5362) (0.5058) (0.5132) (0.5366) (0.5732)
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Estimated eﬀect of S′ on height, allowing for diﬀerent rates of false positive reports (Columns) and
false negative reports (Rows), using set of controls 3. The sample is based on 629 observations and the
estimations include set of controls 3.
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